Bridewealth (Robert Quinlan ANTH 468
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In our discussion of sexual selection
we used the “cost of reproduction” as kind of metaphor for understanding gender
differences in sexual motivation. The
theory alludes to receptive females as a kind of scarce commodity that males
compete over. Human reproduction is not
only metaphorically economic. In many societies the commodification of women is
institutionalized in a practice called bridewealth or brideprice. Bridewealth
is a payment that a man or his family makes to a woman’s family for rights to
sexual “access” and rights to the products of her labor and her children’s
labor. In fact the majority of
traditional societies around the world have some form of bridewealth (figure
1).
·
Bridewealth is
the opposite
of dowry (a payment to the
groom’s family).
·
Brideservice is a form of
bridewealth in which a man works for his wife’s family for a period of time
(often several years) in exchange for marriage.
·
Sister exchange is when
two men marry each other’s sister.
Figure 1. Types of Economic Transactions at Marriage Across Cultures
We might try to understand
bridewealth in terms of evolutionary theory.
In particular, we might ask what factors affect a woman’s “reproductive
value”?
Life history theory
is a branch of evolutionary biology that deals with tradeoffs in the timing of
reproductive events and the allocation of “effort” or resources to
reproduction, growth, development and self preservation. “Reproductive value” (or “residual
reproductive value” or RV) is an important life history concept referring to
the number of offspring that an organism (usually a female) can expect to
produce over the remaining course of her life.
(1) Age is one obvious determinant of reproductive value: A 19 year old woman might expect to have as
many as 10 offspring in the rest of her life, while a 60 year old woman can’t
expect to have any more offspring.
(2) Physical condition might also
affect reproductive value: Women in good condition should be able produce more
offspring, while women in poor condition would have fewer offspring. If we convert reproductive value into
bridewealth payments, then we should expect younger women in better condition
to fetch higher bridewealth than do older women in poorer condition.
Recall, however, that ability
to reproduce is not the only consideration that a male has when he decides
whether or not to invest in a particular relationship. One important consideration is whether the
potential mate is likely to be faithful.
Any sign of potential infidelity (like promiscuity) should be cause for
concern. So, we expect men (and their
families) to pay less for women whose potential fidelity is questionable.
People don’t only have
reproductive value, they have economic value too. A woman’s economic
contribution to her family might then influence her bridewealth.
Bridewealth among the Kipsigis of
Monique
Borgerhoff Mulder studied the commodification of women’s reproductive value
among the Kipsigis of
The Kipsigis are patrilineal,
meaning that they trace descent through male links. They are also patrilocal,
meaning that women move to their husband’s house or village at marriage. Post-marital
residence rules [***] are important
because the influence the amount of contact and help the men and women can give
to their kin
[***] or natal
family (birth family).
Plate 1. Kipsigis women get water and firewood
http://www.altomreiser.no/bilder/kenya/jambo_safaris_02_stor.jpg
Kipsigis men marry at about
23 years of age; woman marry at about 16 years on average usually within a year
or two of menarche. Around menarche girls undergo clitoridectomy or circumcision which
is a rite of passage
indicating entry into womanhood.
Plate 2. Kipsigis girls preparing for clitoridectomy
Courtesy of Prof. M. Borgerhoff Mulder http://www.anthro.ucdavis.edu/faculty/monique/MBMWeb/Moniqueshomepage.htm
Marriages are arranged by
parents. Negotiations begin when the
groom’s father contacts the bride’s father and makes an offer of bridewealth
payment. This first offer is always
rejected in attempt to bargain for a greater payment. Several suitors usually
will be negotiating with the bride’s father simultaneously. The process of negotiating a payment often
takes several months. In the end the
brides father makes a decision about which offer to accept in consultation with
his wife and other close kin. The average
bridwealth payment was 6 cows, 6 goats and 800 Kenyan shillings, which is about
a third of a man’s cattle, half of his goats and 2 months’ wages. The groom’s father makes the payment from his
own resources coming from the natural increase of his herds, any bridewealth
payments made to him for his daughters, and cattle raiding
(which still occurs in remote areas).
The bridewealth payment gives the groom rights to a woman’s children
(whether they are his or not) and rights to products of his wife’s work. Divorce is uncommon, though couples sometimes
separate temporarily if the man becomes abusive.
Plate 3. Drinking beer at a Kipsigis wedding.
Courtesy of Prof. M. Borgerhoff Mulder http://www.anthro.ucdavis.edu/faculty/monique/MBMWeb/Moniqueshomepage.htm
Plate 4. Kipsigis (or maybe Nandi) in clitoridectomy costume circa 1920.
[If you know more about this
picture, please contact rquinlan@wsu.edu
]
http://www.safarimuseum.com/museum_shop/postcards/NL1024_osa_w_lumbwa_women.jpg
A young woman migth have sex
before marriage during the course of negotiations. About 4% of women get
pregnant before marriage. If bride-to-be becomes pregnant before marriage there
are several possible outcomes: (1) The bride’s father will try to force his
daughter’s mate into marriage. This
seems to be the preferred solution. If a marriage cannot be arranged, then (2)
the daughter could remain in her father’s house for her entire life and have
illegitimate children. This is not an
attractive option for most Kipsigis, though if a man has no sons who will bring
in wives for agricultural labor, then he may encourage his daughter to stay
with him. (3) The bride-to-be can have
her baby and resume negotiations after the child is born. The woman’s illegitimate children will go
with the mother to live with her new husband.
The Kipsigis call women with illegitimate children “accompanied”
brides. Pregnancy before the settlement
of marriage negotiations can affect the bridewealth payment. If the groom’s father is wealthier than the
bride’s father (BF<GF) then pregnancy decreases the brides value (figure 2). If the bride’s father is wealthier than the
groom’s father (BF>GF) then pregnancy actually increases the bride’s value
(figure 2). This finding suggests that
getting a prospective bride pregnant can be an influential and strategic factor
in bridewealth negotiations. (Can you
think of other examples of where people might use pregnancy to influence
marriage considerations?)
Figure 2. Effect of pregnancy on bridewealth payment among Kipsigis
The practice of bridewealth
may seem primitive to us, but wedding customs in the
What about variation in Kipsigis women’s
bridewealth value?
As predicted by life history theory,
Borgerhoff Mulder found a significant of inverse correlation (r = -.24) between
bride’s age at circumcision and the bridewealth paid for her. Women marry about a year or two after
circumcision. That means older brides yielded lower bridewealth. If you imagine
age plotted on the horizontal (x-axis) of a two dimension graph and bridewealth
plotted on the vertical (y-axis), then imagine a line that slopes downward as
age increases (figure 3): That is the relationship between age and bridewealth. You can visualize a correlation coefficient
or “r” of -.24 compared with other values by following the link.
Figure 3. Correlation between Kipsigis
brides’ age at circumcision and her bridewealth payment. Each dot represents one bride.
In a second test of the
association between reproductive value and economic value, Monique compared the
proportion of “plump” versus “skinny” women whose family received a high
bridewealth payment. As you might imagine, it is not terribly attractive to be
“skinny” in a subsistence
economy in sub-Saharan
Figure 4. Probability of obtaining a high bridewealth payment for plump
and skinny Kipsigis women
Plate 5. Kipsigis woman cooks maize.
Courtesy of Prof. M. Borgerhoff Mulder http://www.anthro.ucdavis.edu/faculty/monique/MBMWeb/Moniqueshomepage.htm
Monique also predicted that
questions about a potential bride’s fidelity might also influence her
bridewealth value. After all, a woman’s
reproductive value makes no difference to her mate if he is not sure that he is
the father of her offspring. If a woman
had premarital sex, became pregnant and her father was unable to settle
bridewealth negotiations, then one assumes that there may have been some
question about the paternity of the offspring.
The results showed that brides “accompanied” by illegitimate offspring
obtained lower bridewealth than did woman who did not become pregnant before marriage
(figure 5). Of course, this is not
unequivocal evidence that concerns about fidelity were at play; however, Prof.
Borgerhoff Mulder also found that accompanied brides were more likely to be
beaten by their husbands, suggesting that there was some concern about coercing
and controlling her behavior.
Plate 6. Kipsigis women.
Courtesy of Prof. M. Borgerhoff Mulder http://www.anthro.ucdavis.edu/faculty/monique/MBMWeb/Moniqueshomepage.htm
Figure 5. Bridewealth payment
for women with and without illegitimate children
Finally, not all issues about
a Kipsigis woman’s value are about her reproductive value. Recall that Kipsigis are patrilocal. Though bridewealth gives a man rights to the
products of his wife’s labor, there is one exception: At harvest time a woman is expected to return
to her natal family and help with the harvest.
The ability to help her natal family becomes less likely the further a
woman moves away at marriage. Families
whose daughter marries a man in a distant village can expect to lose her labor;
hence, we might predict that they would seek compensation for the loss of their
daughter’s future labor by demanding higher brideweath. The data supported this prediction: Women who
married men from distant locals tended to obtain higher brideweath than did
women who married men from nearby (figure 6).
Figure 6. Bridewealth payment by husband’s distance from bride’s natal
home
Summary
Bridewealth is a common
practice cross-culturally. The value of
a bride is consistent with her reproductive value. Age and physical condition are two important
considerations. Questions about a
bride’s fidelity and economic value may also be important. An evolutionary behavioral ecology
approach can help us understand seemingly exotic cultural practices. Finally, if any heritable traits are consistently
associated with a woman’s brdiewealth value, then male-choice (in addition to
male-male competition and female-choice) could be an important force in sexual selection
among humans.
Further reading: M. Borgerhoff Mulder 1988. Kipsigis bridewealth
payments. In L. Betzig et al. (eds.) Human
Reproductive Behavior: A Darwinian Perspective.