THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE

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latter is already at work. Thus it is exemplary that Détienne and Vernant
should have made themselves the storytellers of this “labyrinthine intel-
ligence” (“intelligence en dédales”), as Franoise Frontisi so well terms
it. This discursive practice of the story (l’histoire) is both its art and its
discourse.

At bottom, this is all a very old story. When he grew old, Aristotle,
who is not generally considered exactly a tightrope dancer, liked to lose
himself in the most labyrinthine and subtle of discourses. He had then
arrived at the age of mésis: “The more solitary and isolated I become,
the more I come to like stories.” He had explained the reason admirably:
as in the older Freud, it was a connoisseur’s admiration for the tact
that composed harmonies and for its art of doing it by surprise: “The
lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for myth is composed of
wonders.”

Part III
Spatial Practices

Chapter VII  Walking in the City

S
EEING Manhattan from the 10th floor of the World Trade
Center. Beneath the haze stirred up by the winds, the urban
island, a sea in the middle of the sea, lifts up the skyscrapers over
Wall Street, sinks down at Greenwich, then rises again to the crests of
Midtown, quietly passes over Central Park and finally undulates off into
the distance beyond Harlem. A wave of verticals. Its agitation is
momentarily arrested by vision. The gigantic mass is immobilized before
the eyes. It is transformed into a texturology in which extremes
coincide—extremes of ambition and degradation, brutal oppositions of
races and styles, contrasts between yesterday’s buildings, already trans-
formed into trash cans, and today’s urban irruptions that block out its
space. Unlike Rome, New York has never learned the art of growing old
by playing on all its pasts. Its present invents itself, from hour to hour,
in the act of throwing away its previous accomplishments and challeng-
ing the future. A city composed of paroxysmal places in monumental reliefs.
The spectator can read in it a universe that is constantly exploding. In it
are inscribed the architectural figures of the coincidatio oppositorum
formerly drawn in miniatures and mystical textures. On this stage of
concrete, steel and glass, cut out between two oceans (the Atlantic and
the American) by a frigid body of water, the tallest letters in the world
compose a gigantic rhetoric of excess in both expenditure and pro-
duction.
Voyeurs or walkers

To what erotics of knowledge does the ecstasy of reading such a cosmos belong? Having taken a voluptuous pleasure in it, I wonder what is the source of this pleasure of “seeing the whole,” of looking down on, totalizing the most immoderate of human texts.

To be lifted to the summit of the World Trade Center is to be lifted out of the city’s grasp. One’s body is no longer clasped by the streets that turn and return it according to an anonymous law; nor is it possessed, whether as player or played, by the rumble of so many differences and by the nervousness of New York traffic. When one goes up there, he leaves behind the mass that carries off and mixes up in itself any identity of authors or spectators. An Icarus flying above these waters, he can ignore the devices of Daedalus in mobile and endless labyrinths far below. His elevation transfigures him into a voyeur. It puts him at a distance. It transforms the bewitching world by which one was “possessed” into a text that lies before one’s eyes. It allows one to read it, to be a solar Eye, looking down like a god. The exaltation of a scopic and gnostic drive: the fiction of knowledge is related to this lust to be a viewpoint and nothing more.

Must one finally fall back into the dark space where crowds move back and forth, crowds that, though visible from on high, are themselves unable to see down below? An Icarian fall. On the 110th floor, a poster, sphinx-like, addresses an enigmatic message to the pedestrian who is for an instant transformed into a visionary: It’s hard to be down when you’re up.

The desire to see the city preceded the means of satisfying it. Medieval or Renaissance painters represented the city as seen in a perspective that no eye had yet enjoyed. This fiction already made the medieval spectator into a celestial eye. It created gods. Have things changed since technical procedures have organized an “all-seeing power”? The totalizing eye imagined by the painters of earlier times lives on in our achievements. The same scopic drive haunts users of architectural productions by materializing today the utopia that yesterday was only painted. The 1370 foot high tower that serves as a prow for Manhattan continues to construct the fiction that creates readers, makes the complexity of the city readable, and immobilizes its opaque mobility in a transparent text.

Is the immense texturology spread out before one’s eyes anything more than a representation, an optical artifact? It is the analogue of the facsimile produced, through a projection that is a way of keeping aloof, by the space planner urbanist, city planner or cartographer. The panorama-city is a “theoretical” (that is, visual) simulacrum, in short a picture, whose condition of possibility is an oblivion and a misunderstanding of practices. The voyeur-god created by this fiction, who, like Schreber’s God, knows only cadavers, must disentangle himself from the murky intertwining daily behaviors and make himself alien to them. 

The ordinary practitioners of the city live “down below,” below the thresholds at which visibility begins. They walk—an elementary form of this experience of the city; they are walkers, Wandermänner, whose bodies follow the thicks and thins of an urban “text” they write without being able to read it. These practitioners make use of spaces that cannot be seen; their knowledge of them is as blind as that of lovers in each other’s arms. The paths that correspond in this intertwining, unrecognizable poems in which each body is an element signed by many others, elude legibility. It is as though the practices organizing a bustling city were characterized by their blindness. The networks of these moving, intersecting writings compose a manifold story that has neither author nor spectator, shaped out of fragments of trajectories and alterations of spaces: in relation to representations, it remains daily and indefinitely other.

Escaping the imaginary totalizations produced by the eye, the everyday has a certain strangeness that does not surface, or whose surface is only its upper limit, outlining itself against the visible. Within this ensemble, I shall try to locate the practices that are foreign to the “geometrical” or “geographical” space of visual, panoptic, or theoretical constructions. These practices of space refer to a specific form of operations (“ways of operating”), to “another spatiality” (an “anthropological,” poetic and mythic experience of space), and to an opaque and blind mobility characteristic of the bustling city. A migrational, or metaphorical, city thus slips into the clear text of the planned and readable city.

1. From the concept of the city to urban practices

The World Trade Center is only the most monumental figure of Western urban development. The utopia-utopia of optical knowledge has long had the ambition of surmounting and articulating the contradictions arising from urban agglomeration. It is a question of managing a growth of human agglomeration or accumulation. “The city is a huge monastery,” said Erasmus. Perspective vision and prospective vision constitute the twofold projection of an opaque past and an uncertain future onto a
surface that can be dealt with. They inaugurate (in the sixteenth century?) the transformation of the urban fact into the concept of a city. Long before the concept itself gives rise to a particular figure of history, it assumes that this fact can be dealt with as a unity determined by an urbanistic ratio. Linking the city to the concept never makes them identical, but it plays on their progressive symbiosis: to plan a city is both to think the very plurality of the real and to make that way of thinking the plural effective; it is to know how to articulate it and be able to do it.

An operational concept?

The “city” founded by utopian and urbanistic discourse is defined by the possibility of a threefold operation:

1. The production of its own space (un espace propre): rational organization must thus repress all the physical, mental and political pollutions that would compromise it;

2. the substitution of a nowhen, or of a synchronic system, for the indeterminable and stubborn resistances offered by traditions; univocal scientific strategies, made possible by the flattening out of all the data in a plane projection, must replace the tactics of users who take advantage of “opportunities” and who, through these trap-events, these lapses in visibility, reproduce the opacities of history everywhere;

3. finally, the creation of a universal and anonymous subject which is the city itself: it gradually becomes possible to attribute to it, as to its political model, Hobbes’ State, all the functions and predicates that were previously scattered and assigned to many different real subjects—groups, associations, or individuals. “The city,” like a proper name, thus provides a way of conceiving and constructing space on the basis of a finite number of stable, isolatable, and interconnected properties.

Administration is combined with a process of elimination in this place organized by “speculative” and classificatory operations. On the one hand, there is a differentiation and redistribution of the parts and functions of the city, as a result of inversions, displacements, accumulations, etc.; on the other there is a rejection of everything that is not capable of being dealt with in this way and so constitutes the “waste products” of a functionalist administration (abnormality, deviance, illness, death, etc.). To be sure, progress allows an increasing number of these waste products to be reintroduced into administrative circuits and transforms even deficiencies (in health, security, etc.) into ways of making the networks of order denser. But in reality, it repeatedly produces effects contrary to those at which it aims: the profit system generates a loss which, in the multiple forms of wretchedness and poverty outside the system and of waste inside it, constantly turns production into “expenditure.” Moreover, the rationalization of the city leads to its mythification in strategic discourses, which are calculations based on the hypothesis or the necessity of its destruction in order to arrive at a final decision. Finally, the functionalist organization, by privileging progress (i.e., time), causes the condition of its own possibility—space itself—to be forgotten; space thus becomes the blind spot in a scientific and political technology. This is the way in which the Concept-city functions, a place of transformations and appropriations, the object of various kinds of interference but also a subject that is constantly enriched by new attributes, it is simultaneously the machinery and the hero of modernity.

Today, whatever the avatars of this concept may have been, we have to acknowledge that if in discourse the city serves as a totalizing and almost mythical landmark for socioeconomic and political strategies, urban life increasingly permits the re-emergence of the element that the urbanistic project excluded. The language of power is in itself “urbanizing,” but the city is left prey to contradictory movements that counterbalance and combine themselves outside the reach of panoptic power. The city becomes the dominant theme in political legends, but it is no longer a field of programmed and regulated operations. Beneath the discourses that ideologize the city, the rules and combinations of powers that have no readable identity proliferate; without points where one can take hold of them, without rational transparency, they are impossible to administer.

The return of practices

The Concept-city is decaying. Does that mean that the illness afflicting both the rationality that founded it and its professionals afflicts the urban populations as well? Perhaps cities are deteriorating along with the procedures that organized them. But we must be careful here. The ministers of knowledge have always assumed that the whole universe
was threatened by the very changes that affected their ideologies and their positions. They transmute the misfortune of their theories into theories of misfortune. When they transform their bewilderment into "catastrophes," when they seek to enclose the people in the "panic" of their discourses, are they once more necessarily right?

Rather than remaining within the field of a discourse that upholds its privilege by inverting its content (speaking of catastrophe and no longer of progress), one can try another path: one can try another path: one can analyze the microbe-like, singular and plural practices which an urbanistic system was supposed to administer or suppress, but which have outlived its decay; one can follow the swarming activity of these procedures that, far from being regulated or eliminated by panoptic administration, have reinforced themselves in a proliferating illegitimacy, developed and insinuated themselves into the networks of surveillance, and combined in accord with unreadable but stable tactics to the point of constituting everyday regulations and surreptitious creativities that are merely concealed by the frantic mechanisms and discourses of the observational organization.

This pathway could be inscribed as a consequence, but also as the reciprocal, of Foucault's analysis of the structures of power. He moved it in the direction of mechanisms and technical procedures, "minor instrumentalities" capable, merely by their organization of "details," of transforming a human multiplicity into a "disciplinary" society and of managing, differentiating, classifying, and hierarchizing all deviances concerning apprenticeship, health, justice, the army, or work.10 "These often miniscule uses of discipline," these "minor but flawless" mechanisms, draw their efficacy from a relationship between procedures and the space that they redistribute in order to make an "operator" out of it. But what spatial practices correspond, in the area where discipline is manipulated, to these apparatuses that produce a disciplinary space? In the present conjuncture, which is marked by a contradiction between the collective mode of administration and an individual mode of reappropriation, this question is no less important, if one admits that spatial practices in fact secretly structure the determining conditions of social life. I would like to follow out a few of these multiform, resistance, tricky and stubborn procedures that elude discipline without being outside the field in which it is exercised, and which should lead us to a theory of everyday practices, of lived space, of the disquieting familiarity of the city.

2. The chorus of idle footsteps

"The goddess can be recognized by her step"
Virgil, Aeneid, I, 405

Their story begins on ground level, with footsteps. They are myriad, but do not compose a series. They cannot be counted because each unit has a qualitative character: a style of tactile apprehension and kinesthetic appropriation. Their swarming mass is an innumerable collection of singularities. Their intertwined paths give their shape to spaces. They weave places together. In that respect, pedestrian movements form one of these "real systems whose existence in fact makes up the city."11 They are not localized; it is rather they that spatialize. They are no more inserted within a container than those Chinese characters speakers sketch out on their hands with their fingertips.

It is true that the operations of walking on can be traced on city maps in such a way as to transcribe their paths (here well-trodden, there very faint) and their trajectories (going this way and not that). But these thick or thin curves only refer, like words, to the absence of what has passed by. Surveys of routes miss what was: the act itself of passing by. The operation of walking, wandering, or "window shopping," that is, the activity of passers-by, is transformed into points that draw a totalizing and reversible line on the map. They allow us to grasp only a relic set in the nowhen of a surface of projection. Itself visible, it has the effect of making invisible the operation that made it possible. These fixations constitute procedures for forgetting. The trace left behind is substituted for the practice. It exhibits the (voracious) property that the geographical system has of being able to transform action into legibility, but in doing so it causes a way of being in the world to be forgotten.

Pedestrian speech acts

A comparison with the speech act will allow us to go further12 and not limit ourselves to the critique of graphic representations alone, looking from the shores of legibility toward an inaccessible beyond. The act of walking is to the urban system what the speech act is to language or to the statements uttered.13 At the most elementary level, it has a triple "enunciative" function: it is a process of appropriation of the topographical system on the part of the pedestrian (just as the speaker
appropriates and takes on the language; it is a spatial acting-out of the place (just as the speech act is an acoustic acting-out of language); and it implies relations among differentiated positions, that is, among pragmatic “contracts” in the form of movements (just as verbal enunciation is an “allocation,” “posits another opposite” the speaker and puts contracts between interlocutors into action). It thus seems possible to give a preliminary definition of walking as a space of enunciation.

We could moreover extend this problematic to the relations between the act of writing and the written text, and even transpose it to the relationships between the “hand” (the touch and the tale of the paintbrush [le et la geste du pinceau]) and the finished painting (form, colors, etc.). At first isolated in the area of verbal communication, the speech act turns out to find only one of its applications there, and its linguistic modality is merely the first determination of a much more general distinction between the forms used in a system and the ways of using this system (i.e., rules), that is, between two “different worlds,” since “the same things” are considered from two opposite formal viewpoints.

Considered from this angle, the pedestrian speech act has three characteristics which distinguish it at the outset from the spatial system: the present, the discrete, the “phatic.”

First, if it is true that a spatial order organizes an ensemble of possibilities (e.g., by a place in which one can move) and interdictions (e.g., by a wall that prevents one from going further), then the walker actualizes some of these possibilities. In that way, he makes them exist as well as emerge. But he also moves them about and he invents others, since the crossing, drifting away, or improvisation of walking privilege, transform or abandon spatial elements. Thus Charlie Chaplin multiplies the possibilities of his cane: he does other things with the same thing and he goes beyond the limits that the determinants of the object set on its utilization. In the same way, the walker transforms each spatial signifier into something else. And if on the one hand he actualizes only a few of the possibilities fixed by the constructed order (he goes only here and not there), on the other he increases the number of possibilities (for example, by creating shortcuts and detours) and prohibitions (for example, he forbids himself to take paths generally considered accessible or even obligatory). He thus makes a selection. “The user of a city picks out certain fragments of the statement in order to actualize them in secret.”

He thus creates a discreteness, whether by making choices among the signifiers of the spatial “language” or by displacing them through the use he makes of them. He condemns certain places to inertia or disappearance and composes with others spatial “turns of phrase” that are “rare,” “accidental” or illegitimate. But that already leads into a rhetoric of walking.

In the framework of enunciation, the walker constitutes, in relation to his position, both a near and a far, a here and a there. To the fact that the adverbs here and there are the indicators of the locutionary seat in verbal communication—a coincidence that reinforces the parallelism between linguistic and pedestrian enunciation—we must add that this location (here—there) (necessarily implied by walking and indicative of a present appropriation of space by an “I”) also has the function of introducing an other in relation to this “I” and of thus establishing a conjunctive and conjunctive articulation of places. I would stress particularly the “phatic” aspect, by which I mean the function, isolated by Malinowski and Jakobson, of terms that initiate, maintain, or interrupt contact, such as “hello,” “well, well,” etc. Walking, which alternately follows a path and has followers, creates a mobile organicity in the environment, a sequence of phatic topoi. And if it is true that the phatic function, which is an effort to ensure communication, is already characteristic of the language of talking birds, just as it constitutes the “first verbal function acquired by children,” it is not surprising that it also gambols, goes on all fours, dances, and walks about, with a light or heavy step, like a series of “hellos” in an echoing labyrinth, anterior or parallel to informative speech.

The modalities of pedestrian enunciation which a plane representation on a map brings out could be analyzed. They include the kinds of relationship this enunciation entertains with particular paths (or “statements”) by according them a truth value (“alethic” modalities of the necessary, the impossible, the possible, or the contingent), an epistemological value (“epistemic” modalities of the certain, the excluded, the plausible, or the questionable) or finally an ethical or legal value (“deontic” modalities of the obligatory, the forbidden, the permitted, or the optional). Walking affirms, suspects, tries out, transgresses, respects, etc., the trajectories it “speaks.” All the modalities sing a part in this chorus, changing from step to step, stepping in through proportions, sequences, and intensities which vary according to the time, the path taken and the walker. These enunciatory operations are of an unlimited diversity. They therefore cannot be reduced to their graphic trail.
Walking rhetorics

The walking of passers-by offers a series of turns (tours) and detours that can be compared to “turns of phrase” or “stylistic figures.” There is a rhetoric of walking. The art of “turning” phrases finds an equivalent in an art of composing a path (tourner un parcours). Like ordinary language, this art implies and combines styles and uses. Style specifies “a linguistic structure that manifests on the symbolic level . . . an individual’s fundamental way of being in the world,” it connotes a singular. 

Use defines the social phenomenon through which a system of communication manifests itself in actual fact; it refers to a norm. Style and use both have to do with a “way of operating” (of speaking, walking, etc.), but style involves a peculiar processing of the symbolic, while use refers to elements of a code. They intersect to form a style of use, a way of being and a way of operating. 

In introducing the notion of a “residing rhetoric” (“rhétorique habitante”), the fertile pathway opened up by A. Médam and systematized by S. Ostrowetsky and J.-F. Augoyard, we assume that the “tropes” catalogued by rhetoric furnish models and hypotheses for the analysis of ways of appropriating places. Two postulates seem to me to underlie the validity of this application: 1) it is assumed that practices of space also correspond to manipulations of the basic elements of a constructed order; 2) it is assumed that they are, like the tropes in rhetoric, deviations relative to a sort of “literal meaning” defined by the urbanistic system. There would thus be a homology between verbal figures and the figures of walking (a stylized selection among the latter is already found in the figures of dancing) insofar as both consist in “treatments” or operations bearing on isolatable units, and in “ambiguous dispositions” that divert and displace meaning in the direction of equivocalness in the way a tremulous image confuses and multiplies the photographed object. In these two modes, the analogy can be accepted. I would add that the geometrical space of urbanists and architects seems to have the status of the “proper meaning” constructed by grammarians and linguists in order to have a normal and normative level to which they can compare the drifting of “figurative” language. In reality, this faceless “proper” meaning (ce “propre” sans figure) cannot be found in current use, whether verbal or pedestrian; it is merely the fiction produced by a use that is also particular, the metalinguistic use of science that distinguishes itself by that very distinction.
3. Myths: what "makes things go"

The figures of these movements (synecdoches, ellipses, etc.) characterize both a "symbolic order of the unconscious" and "certain typical processes of subjectivity manifested in discourse." The similarity between "discoarse" and dreams has to do with their use of the same "stylistic procedures"; it therefore includes pedestrian practices as well. The "ancient catalog of tropes" that from Freud to Benveniste has furnished an appropriate inventory for the rhetoric of the first two registers of expression is equally valid for the third. If there is a parallelism, it is not only because enunciation is dominant in these three areas, but also because its discursive (verbalized, dreamed, or walked) development is organized as a relation between the place from which it proceeds (an origin) and the nowhere it produces (a way of "going by").

From this point of view, after having compared pedestrian processes to linguistic formations, we can bring them back down in the direction of oneric figuration, or at least discover on that other side what, in a spatial practice, is inseparable from the dreamed place. To walk is to lack a place. It is the indefinite process of being absent and in search of a proper. The moving about that the city multiplies and concentrates makes the city itself an immense social experience of lacking a place—an experience that is, to be sure, broken up into countless tiny deportations (displacements and walks), compensated for by the relationships and intersections of these exoduses that intertwine and create an urban fabric, and placed under the sign of what ought to be, ultimately, the place but is only a name, the City. The identity furnished by this place is all the more symbolic (named) because, in spite of the inequality of its citizens' positions and profits, there is only a pullulation of passer-bys, a network of residences temporarily appropriated by pedestrian traffic, a shuffling among pretenses of the proper, a universe of rented spaces haunted by a nowhere or by dreamed-of places.

Names and symbols

An indication of the relationship that spatial practices entertain with that absence is furnished precisely by their manipulations of and with "proper" names. The relationships between the direction of a walk (le sens de la marche) and the meaning of words (le sens des mots) situate two sorts of apparently contrary movements, one extrovert (to walk is to go outside), the other introvert (a mobility under the stability of the signifier). Walking is in fact determined by semantic tropisms; it is attracted and repelled by nominations whose meaning is not clear, whereas the city, for its part, is transformed for many people into a "desert" in which the meaningless, indeed the terrifying, no longer takes the form of shadows but becomes, as in Genet's plays, an implaceable light that produces this urban text without obscurities, which is created by a technocratic power everywhere and which puts the city-dweller under control (under the control of what? No one knows): "The city
keeps us under its gaze, which one cannot bear without feeling dizzy,”
says a resident of Rouen. In the spaces brutally lit by an alien reason,
proper names carve out pockets of hidden and familiar meanings. They
“make sense”; in other words, they are the impetus of movements, like
vocations and calls that turn or divert an itinerary by giving it a meaning
(or a direction) (sens) that was previously unforeseen. These names create
a nowhere in places; they change them into passages.

A friend who lives in the city of Sèvres drifts, when he is in Paris,
toward the rue des Saints-Pères and the rue de Sèvres, even though he is
going to see his mother in another part of town: these names articulate a
sentence that his steps compose without his knowing it. Numbered
streets and street numbers (112th St., or 9 rue Saint-Charles) orient the
magnetic field of trajectories just as they can haunt dreams. Another
friend unconsciously represses the streets which have names and, by
this fact, transmit her—orders or identities in the same way as summons
and classifications; she goes instead along paths that have no name or
signature. But her walking is thus still controlled negatively by proper
names.

What is it then that they spell out? Disposed in constellations that
hierarchize and semantically order the surface of the city, operating
chronological arrangements and historical justifications, these words
(Borrego, Botzaris, Bougainville ...) slowly lose, like worn coins, the
value engraved on them, but their ability to signify outlive its first de-
dinition. Saints-Pères, Coretin Celton, Red Square ... these names make
themselves available to the diverse meanings given them by passers-by;
they detach themselves from the places they were supposed to define and
serve as imaginary meeting-points on itineraries which, as metaphors,
determine for reasons that are foreign to their original value but
may be recognized or not by passers-by. A strange toponymy that is
detached from actual places and flies high over the city like a foggy
geography of “meanings” held in suspension, directing the physical
deambulations below: Place de l’Étoile, Concorde, Poissonnière ...
These constellations of names provide traffic patterns: they are stars
directing itineraries. “The Place de la Concorde does not exist,”
Malaparte said, “it is an idea.” It is much more than an “idea.” A
whole series of comparisons would be necessary to account for the
magical powers proper names enjoy. They seem to be carried as emblems
by the travellers they direct and simultaneously decorate.

Linking acts and footsteps, opening meanings and directions, these
words operate in the name of an emptying-out and wearing-away of
their primary role. They become liberated spaces that can be occupied.
A rich indetermination gives them, by means of a semantic rarefaction,
the function of articulating a second, poetic geography on top of the
geography of the literal, forbidden or permitted meaning. They insinuate
other routes into the functionalist and historical order of movement.
Walking follows them: “I fill this great empty space with a beautiful
name.” People are put in motion by the remaining relics of meaning,
and sometimes by their waste products, the inverted remainders of
great ambitions. Things that amount to nothing, or almost nothing,
symbolize and orient walkers’ steps: names that have ceased precisely to
be “proper.”

In these symbolizing kernels three distinct (but connected) functions
of the relations between spatial and signifying practices are indicated
(and perhaps founded): the believable, the memorable, and the primitive.
They designate what “authorizes” (or makes possible or credible) spatial
appropriations, what is repeated in them (or is recalled in them) from a
silent and withdrawn memory, and what is structured in them and con-
tinues to be signed by an in-fantile (in-fans) origin. These three symbolic
mechanisms organize the topoi of a discourse on/of the city (legend,
memory, and dream) in a way that also eludes urbanistic systematicity.
They can already be recognized in the functions of proper names: they
make habitable or believable the place that they clothe with a word (by
emptying themselves of their classifying power, they acquire that of
“permitting” something else); they recall or suggest phantoms (the dead
who are supposed to have disappeared) that still move about, concealed
in gestures and in bodies in motion; and, by naming, that is, by imposing
an injunction proceeding from the other (a story) and by altering func-
tionalist identity by detaching themselves from it, they create in the
place itself that erosion or nowhere that the law of the other carves out
within it.

Credible things and memorable things: habitability

By a paradox that is only apparent, the discourse that makes people
believe is the one that takes away what it urges them to believe in, or
never delivers what it promises. Far from expressing a void or describing
a lack, it creates such. It makes room for a void. In that way, it opens up
clearings; it "allows" a certain play within a system of defined places. It
"authorizes" the production of an area of free play (Spieleraum) on a
checkerboard that analyzes and classifies identities. It makes places
habitable. On these grounds, I call such discourse a "local authority." It
is a crack in the system that saturates places with significations and
indeed so reduces them to this significations that it is "impossible to
breathe in them." It is a symptomatic tendency of functionalist totalitar-
ianism (including its programming of games and celebrations) that it
seeks precisely to eliminate these local authorities, because they com-
promise the univocality of the system. Totalitarianism attacks what it
otherwise calls superstitions: supererogatory semantic overlays that
insert themselves "over and above" and "in excess," and annex to a
past or poetic realm a part of the land the promoters of technical
rationalities and financial profitabilities had reserved for themselves.

Ultimately, since proper names are already "local authorities" or
"superstitions," they are replaced by numbers: on the telephone, one no
longer dials Opera, but 073. The same is true of the stories and legends
that haunt urban space like superfluous or additional inhabitants. They
are the object of a witch-hunt, by the very logic of the techno-structure.
But their extermination (like the extermination of trees, forests, and
hidden places in which such legends live) makes the city a "suspended
symbolic order." The habitable city is thereby annulled. Thus, as a
woman from Rouen put it, no, here "there isn't any place special, except
for my own home, that's all... There isn't anything." Nothing "special":
nothing that is marked, opened up by a memory or a story, signed by
something or someone else. Only the cave of the home remains belie-
vable, still open for a certain time to legends, still full of shadows. Except
for that, according to another city-dweller, there are only "places in
which one can no longer believe in anything." It is through the opportu-
nity they offer to store up rich silences and wordless stories, or rather through their capacity to create cellars and
garrets everywhere, that local legends (legenda: what is to be read, but
also what can be read) permit exits, ways of going out and coming back
in, and thus habitable spaces. Certainly walking about and traveling
substitute for exits, for going away and coming back, which were for-
merly made available by a body of legends that places nowadays lack.
Physical moving about has the itinerant function of yesterday's or today's
"superstitions." Travel (like walking) is a substitute for the legends that
used to open up space to something different. What does travel
ultimately produce if it is not, by a sort of reversal, "an exploration of the
deserted places of my memory," the return to nearby exoticism by way of
a detour through distant places, and the "discovery" of relics and
legends: "fleeting visions of the French countryside," "fragments of music
and poetry," in short, something like an "uprooting in one's origins
(Heidegger)? What this walking exile produces is precisely the body of
legends that is currently lacking in one's own vicinity; it is a fiction,
which moreover has the double characteristic, like dreams or pedestrian
rhetoric, of being the effect of displacements and condensations. As a
corollary, one can measure the importance of these signifying practices
to tell oneself legends) as practices that invent spaces.

From this point of view, their contents remain revelatory, and still
more so is the principle that organizes them. Stories about places are
makeup things. They are composed with the world's debris. Even if the
literary form and the actantial schema of "superstitions" correspond to
stable models whose structures and combinations have often been ana-
lyzed over the past thirty years, the materials (all the rhetorical details
of their "manifestation") are furnished by the leftovers from nominations,
taxonomies, heroic or comic predicats, etc., that is, by fragments of
scattered semantic places. These heterogeneous and even contrary ele-
ments fill the homogeneous form of the story. Things extra and other
details and excesses coming from elsewhere) insert themselves into the
accepted framework, the imposed order. One thus has the very relation-
ship between spatial practices and the constructed order. The surface of
this order is everywhere punctured and torn open by ellipses, drifts, and
leaks of meaning; it is a sieve-order.

The verbal relics of which the story is composed, being tied to lost
stories and opaque facts, are juxtaposed in a collage where their relations
are not thought, and for this reason they form a symbolic whole. They
are articulated by lacunae. Within the structured space of the text, they
thus produce anti-texts, effects of dissimulation and escape, possibilities
of moving into other landscapes, like cellars and bushes: "ō massifs, ō
pluriels." Because of the process of dissemination that they open up,
stories differ from rumors in that the latter are always injunctions,
initiators and results of a levelling of space, creators of common move-
ments that reinforce an order by adding an activity of making people
believe things to that of making people do things. Stories diversify,
rumors totalize. If there is still a certain oscillation between them, it
seems that today there is rather a stratification: stories are becoming private and sink into the secluded places in neighborhoods, families, or individuals, while the rumors propagated by the media cover everything and, gathered under the figure of the City, the masterword of an anonymous law, the substitute for all proper names, they wipe out or combat any superstitions guilty of still resisting the figure.

The dispersion of stories points to the dispersion of the memorable as well. And in fact memory is a sort of anti-museum: it is not localizable. Fragments of it come out in legends. Objects and words also have hollow places in which a past sleeps, as in the everyday acts of walking, eating, going to bed, in which ancient revolutions slumber. A memory is only a Prince Charming who stays just long enough to awaken the Sleeping Beauties of our wordless stories. “Here, there used to be a bakery.” “That’s where old lady Dupuis used to live.” It is striking here that the places people live in are like the presences of absences. What can be seen designates what is no longer there: “you see, here there used to be . . .,” but it can no longer be seen. Demonstratives indicate the invisible identities of the visible: it is the very definition of a place, in fact, that it is composed by these series of displacements and effects among the fragmented strata that form it and that it plays on these moving layers.

“Memories tie us to that place . . . It’s personal, not interesting to anyone else, but after all that’s what gives a neighborhood its character.” There is no place that is not haunted by many different spirits hidden there in silence, spirits one can “invoke” or not. Haunted places are the only ones people can live in—and this inverts the schema of the *Panopticon*. But like the gothic sculptures of kings and queens that once adorned Notre-Dame and have been buried for two centuries in the basement of a building in the rue de la Chaussée-d’Antin, there these “spirits,” themselves broken into pieces in like manner, do not speak any more than they see. This is a sort of knowledge that remains silent. Only hints of what is known but unrevealed are passed on “just between you and me.”

Places are fragmentary and inward-turning histories, pasts that others are not allowed to read, accumulated times that can be unfolded but like stories held in reserve, remaining in an enigmatic state, symbolizations encysted in the pain or pleasure of the body. “I feel good here”\(^{50}\) the well-being under-expressed in the language it appears in like a fleeting glimmer is a spatial practice.

Childhood and metaphors of places

Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else.

Aristotle, *Poetics* 1457b

The memorable is that which can be dreamed about a place. In this place that is a palimpsest, subjectivity is already linked to the absence that structures it as existence and makes it “be there,” *Dasein*. But as we have seen, this being-there acts only in spatial practices, that is, in ways of moving into something different (manières de passer à l’autre). It must ultimately be seen as the repetition, in diverse metaphors, of a decisive and originary experience, that of the child’s differentiation from the mother’s body. It is through that experience that the possibility of space and of a localization (a “not everything”) of the subject is inaugurated. We need not return to the famous analysis Freud made of this matrix-experience by following the game played by his eighteen-month-old grandson, who threw a reel away from himself, crying oh-oh-oh in pleasure, fort! (i.e., “over there,” “gone,” or “no more”) and then pulled it back with the piece of string attached to it with a delighted da! (i.e., “here,” “back again”).\(^{51}\) It suffices here to remember this (perilous and satisfied) process of detachment from indifferenciation in the mother’s body, whose substitute is the spool: this departure of the mother (sometimes she disappears by herself, sometimes the child makes her disappear) constitutes localization and exteriority against the background of an absence. There is a joyful manipulation that can make the maternal object “go away” and make oneself disappear (insofar as one considers oneself identical with that object), making it possible to be there (because) without the other but in a necessary relation to what has disappeared; this manipulation is an “original spatial structure.”

No doubt one could trace this differentiation further back, as far as the naming that separates the foetus identified as masculine from his mother—but how about the female foetus, who is from this very moment introduced into another relationship to space? In the initiatory game, just as in the “joyful activity” of the child who, standing before a mirror, sees itself as one (it is she or he, seen as a whole) but another (that, an image with which the child identifies itself),\(^ {52}\) what counts is the process of this “spatial captation” that inscribes the passage toward the other as
the law of being and the law of place. To practice space is thus to repeat
the joyful and silent experience of childhood; it is, in a place, to be other
and to move toward the other.

Thus begins the walk that Freud compares to the trampling underfoot
of the mother-land. This relationship of oneself to oneself governs the
internal alterations of the place (the relations among its strata) or the
pedestrian unfolding of the stories accumulated in a place (moving about
the city and travelling). The childhood experience that determines spatial
practices later develops its effects, proliferates, floods private and public
spaces, undoes their readable surfaces, and creates within the planned
city a "metaphorical" or mobile city, like the one Kandinsky dreamed of:
"a great city built according to all the rules of architecture and then
suddenly shaken by a force that defies all calculation."\(^{54}\)

Chapter VIII  
Railway Navigation and Incarceration

A  
TRAVELLING INCARCERATION. Immobile inside the train, seeing
immobile things slip by. What is happening? Nothing is moving
inside or outside the train.

The unchanging traveller is pigeonholed, numbered, and regulated in
the grid of the railway car, which is a perfect actualization of the rational
utopia. Control and food move from pigeonhole to pigeonhole: "Tickets,
an escape from the closed system. They are a lovers' phantasm, a way
out for the ill, an escapade for children ("Wee-wee!")—a little space of
irrationality, like love affairs and sewers in the Utopias of earlier times.
Except for this lapse given over to excesses, everything has its place in a
gridwork. Only a rationalized cell travels. A bubble of panoptic and
classifying power, a module of imprisonment that makes possible the
production of an order, a closed and autonomous insularity—that is
what can traverse space and make itself independent of local roots.

Inside, there is the immobility of an order. Here rest and dreams reign
supreme. There is nothing to do, one is in the state of reason. Everything
is in its place, as in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Every being is placed
there like a piece of printer's type on a page arranged in military order.
This order, an organizational system, the quietude of a certain reason, is
the condition of both a railway car's and a text's movement from one
place to another.

Outside, there is another immobility, that of things, towering moun-
tains, stretches of green field and forest, arrested villages, colonnades of
buildings, black urban silhouettes against the pink evening sky, the
twinkling of nocturnal lights on a sea that precedes or succeeds our
histories. The train generalizes Dürer's Melancholia, a speculative ex-
perience of the world: being outside of these things that stay there,
detached and absolute, that leave us without having anything to do with
Chapter IX  Spatial Stories

"Narration created humanity."

In modern Athens, the vehicles of mass transportation are called *metaphorai*. To go to work or come home, one takes a "metaphor"—a bus or a train. Stories could also take this noble name: every day, they traverse and organize places, they select and link them together, they make sentences and itineraries out of them. They are spatial trajectories.

In this respect, narrative structures have the status of spatial syntaxes. By means of a whole panoply of codes, ordered ways of proceeding and constraints, they regulate changes in space (or moves from one place to another) made by stories in the form of places put in linear or interlaced series: from here (Paris), one goes there (Montargis); this place (a room) includes another (a dream or a memory); etc. More than that, when they are represented in descriptions or acted out by actors (a foreigner, a city-dweller, a ghost), these places are linked together more or less tightly or easily by "modalities" that specify the kind of passage leading from one to the other: the transition can be given an "epistemological" modality concerning knowledge (for example: "it's not certain that this is the Place de la République"), an "alethic" one concerning existence (for example, "the land of milk and honey is an improbable end-point"), or a deontic one concerning obligation (for example: "from this point, you have to go over to that one"). These are only a few notations among many others, and serve only to indicate with what subtle complexity stories, whether everyday or literary, serve us as means of mass transportation, as *metaphorai*.

Every story is a travel story—a spatial practice. For this reason, spatial practices concern everyday tactics, are part of them, from the alphabet.
of spatial indication ("It's to the right," "Take a left"), the beginning of a story the rest of which is written by footsteps, to the daily "news" ("Guess who I met at the bakery?")"), television news reports ("Teheran: Khomeini is becoming increasingly isolated . . ."), legends (Cinderellas living in hovels), and stories that are told (memories and fiction of foreign lands or more or less distant times in the past). These narrated adventures, simultaneously producing geographies of actions and drifting into the commonplace of an order, do not merely constitute a "supplement" to pedestrian enunciations and rhetorics. They are not satisfied with displacing the latter and transposing them into the field of language. In reality, they organize walks. They make the journey, before or during the time the feet perform it.

These proliferating metaphors—sayings and stories that organize places through the displacements they "describe" (as a mobile point "describes" a curve)—what kind of analysis can be applied to them? To mention only the studies concerning spatializing operations (and not spatial systems), there are numerous works that provide methods and categories for such an analysis. Among the most recent, particular attention can be drawn to those referring to a semantics of space (John Lyons on "Locative Subjects" and "Spatial Expressions"), a psycholinguistics of perception (Miller and Johnson-Laird on the "hypothesis of localization"), a sociolinguistics of descriptions of places (for example, William Labov's), a phenomenology of the behavior that organizes "territories" (for example, the work of Albert E. Scheflen and Norman Ashcraft), an "ethnemethodology" of the indices of localization in conversation (for example, by Emanuel A. Schegloff), or a semiotics viewing culture as a spatial metalanguage (for example, the work of the Tartu School, especially Y. M. Lotman, B. A. Ouspenski), etc. Just as signifying practices, which concern the ways of putting language into effect, were taken into consideration after linguistic systems had been investigated, today spatializing practices are attracting attention now that the codes and taxonomies of the spatial order have been examined. Our investigation belongs to this "second" moment of the analysis, which moves from structures to actions. But in this vast ensemble, I shall consider only narrative actions; this will allow us to specify a few elementary forms of practices organizing space: the bipolar distinction between "map" and "itinerary," the procedures of delimitation or "marking boundaries" ("bornage") and "enunciative focalizations" (that is, the indication of the body within discourse).

"Spaces" and "places"

At the outset, I shall make a distinction between space (espace) and place (lieu) that delimits a field. A place (lieu) is the order (of whatever kind) in accord with which elements are distributed in relationships of coexistence. It thus excludes the possibility of two things being in the same location (place). The law of the "proper" rules in the place: the elements taken into consideration are beside one another, each situated in its own "proper" and distinct location, a location it defines. A place is thus an instantaneous configuration of positions. It implies an indication of stability.

A space exists when one takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and time variables. Thus space is composed of intersections of mobile elements. It is in a sense actuated by the ensemble of movements deployed within it. Space occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize it, and make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual programs or contractual proximities. On this view, in relation to place, space is like the word when it is spoken, that is, when it is caught in the ambiguity of an actualization, transformed into a term dependent upon many different conventions, situated as the act of a present (or of a time), and modified by the transformations caused by successive contexts. In contradistinction to the place, it has thus none of the univocity or stability of a "proper."

In short, space is a practised place. Thus the street geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into a space by walkers. In the same way, an act of reading is the space produced by the practice of a particular place: a written text, i.e., a place constituted by a system of signs.

Merleau-Ponty distinguished a "geometrical" space ("a homogeneous and isotropic spatiality," analogous to our "place") from another "spatiality" which he called an "anthropological space." This distinction depended on a distinct problematic, which sought to distinguish from "geometrical" univocity the experience of an "outside" given in the form of space, and for which "space is existential" and "existence is spatial." This experience is a relation to the world; in dreams and in perception, and because it probably precedes their differentiation, it expresses "the same essential structure of our being as a being situated in relationship to a milieu"—being situated by a desire, indissociable from a "direction of existence" and implanted in the space of a landscape. From this point
of view “there are as many spaces as there are distinct spatial experiences.” The perspective is determined by a “phenomenology” of existing in the world.

In our examination of the daily practices that articulate that experience, the opposition between “place” and “space” will rather refer to two sorts of determinations in stories: the first, a determination through objects that are ultimately reducible to the being-there of something dead, the law of a “place” (from the pebble to the cadaver, an inert body always seems, in the West, to find a place and give it the appearance of a tomb); the second, a determination through operations which, when they are attributed to a stone, tree, or human being, specify “spaces” by the actions of historical subjects (a movement always seems to condition the production of a space and to associate it with a history). Between these two determinations, there are passages back and forth, such as the putting to death (or putting into a landscape) of heroes who transgress frontiers and who, guilty of an offense against the law of the place, best provide its restoration with their tombs; or again, on the contrary, the awakening of inert objects (a table, a forest, a person that plays a certain role in the environment) which, emerging from their stability, transform the place where they lay motionless into the foreignness of their own space.

(Stories thus carry out a labor that constantly transforms places into spaces or spaces into places.) They also organize the play of changing relationships between places and spaces. The forms of this play are numberless, fanning out in a spectrum reaching from the putting in place of an immobile and stone-like order (in it, nothing moves except discourse itself, which, like a camera panning over a scene, moves over the whole panorama), to the accelerated succession of actions that multiply spaces (as in the detective novel or certain folktales, though this spatializing frenzy nevertheless remains circumscribed by the textual place). It would be possible to construct a typology of all these stories in terms of identification of places and actualization of spaces. But in order to discern in them the modes in which these distinct operations are combined, we need criteria and analytical categories—a necessity that leads us back to travel stories of the most elementary kind.

**Tours and maps**

Oral descriptions of places, narrations concerning the home, stories about the streets, represent a first and enormous corpus. In a very precise analysis of descriptions New York residents gave of their apartments, C. Linde and W. Labov recognize two distinct types, which they call the “map” and the “tour.” The first is of the type: “The girls’ room is next to the kitchen.” The second: “You turn right and come into the living room.” Now, in the New York corpus, only three percent of the descriptions are of the “map” type. All the rest, that is, virtually the whole corpus, are of the “tour” type: “You come in through a low door,” etc. These descriptions are made for the most part in terms of operations and show how to enter each room. Concerning this second type, the authors point out that a circuit or “tour” is a speech-act (an act of enunciation) that “furnishes a minimal series of paths by which to go into each room”; and that the “path” is a series of units that have the form of vectors that are either “static” (“to the right,” “in front of you,” etc.) or “mobile” (“if you turn to the left,” etc.).

In other words, description oscillates between the terms of an alternative: either seeing (the knowledge of an order of places) or going (spatializing actions). Either it presents a tableau (“there are . . .”), or it organizes movemens (“you enter, you go across, you turn . . .”). Of these two hypotheses, the choices made by the New York narrators overwhelmingly favored the second.

Leaving Linde and Labov's study aside (it is primarily concerned with the rules of the social interactions and conventions that govern “natural language,” a problem we will come back to later), I would like to make use of these New York stories—and other similar stories—to try to specify the relationships between the indicators of “tours” and those of “maps,” where they coexist in a single description. How are acting and seeing coordinated in this realm of ordinary language in which the former is so obviously dominant? The question ultimately concerns the basis of the everyday narrations, the relation between the itinerary (a discursive series of operations) and the map (a plane projection totalizing observations), that is, between two symbolic and anthropological languages of space. Two poles of experience. It seems that in passing from “ordinary” culture to scientific discourse, one passes from one pole to the other.

In narrations concerning apartments or streets, manipulations of space or “tours” are dominant. This form of description usually determines the whole style of the narration. When the other form intervenes, it has the characteristic of being conditioned or presupposed by the first. Examples of tours conditioning a map: “If you turn to the right, there is . . .”, or the closely related form, “If you go straight ahead, you'll see . . .” In
both cases, an action permits one to see something. But there are also cases in which a tour assumes a place indication: "There, there's a door, you take the next one"—an element of mapping is the presupposition of a certain itinerary. The narrative fabric in which describers (descripteurs) of itineraries predominate is thus punctuated by describers of the map type which have the function of indicating either an effect obtained by the tour ("you see...") or a given that it postulates as its limit ("there is a wall"), its possibility ("there's a door"), or an obligation ("there's a one-way street"), etc. The chain of spatializing operations seems to be marked by references to what it produces (a representation of places) or to what it implies (a local order). We thus have the structure of the travel story: stories of journeys and actions are marked out by the "citation" of the places that result from them or authorize them.

From this angle, we can compare the combination of "tours" and "maps" in everyday stories with the manner in which, over the past five centuries, they have been interlaced and then slowly dissociated in literary and scientific representations of space. In particular, if one takes the "map" in its current geographical form, we can see that in the course of the period marked by the birth of modern scientific discourse (i.e., from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century) the map has slowly disengaged itself from the itineraries that were the condition of its possibility. The first medieval maps included only the rectilinear marking out of itineraries (performative indications chiefly concerning pilgrimages), along with the stops one was to make (cities which one was to pass through, spend the night in, pray at, etc.) and distances calculated in hours or in days, that is, in terms of the time it would take to cover them on foot. Each of these maps is a memorandum prescribing actions. The tour to be made is predominant in them. It includes the map elements, just as today the description of a route to be taken accompanies a hasty sketch already on paper, in the form of citations of places, a sort of dance through the city: "20 paces straight ahead, then turn to the left, then another 40 paces..." The drawing articulates spatializing practices, like the maps of urban routes, arts of actions and stories of paces, that serve the Japanese as "adress books,"[11] or the wonderful fifteenth-century Aztec map describing the exodus of the Totomihuacas. This drawing outlines not the "route" (there wasn't one) but the "log" of their journey on foot—an outline marked out by footprints with regular gaps between them and by pictures of the successive events that took place in the course of the journey (meals, battles, crossings of rivers or mountains, etc.): not a "geographical map" but "history book."[12]

Between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the map became more autonomous. No doubt the proliferation of the "narrative" figures that have long been its stock-in-trade (ships, animals, and characters of all kinds) still had the function of indicating the operations—travelling, military, architectural, political or commercial—that make possible the fabrication of a geographical plan.[13] Far from being "illustrations," iconic glosses on the text, these figurations, like fragments of stories, mark on the map the historical operations from which it resulted. Thus the sailing ship painted on the sea indicates the maritime expedition that made it possible to represent the coastlines. It is equivalent to a describer of the "tour" type. But the map gradually wins out over these figures; it colonizes space; it eliminates little by little the pictorial figurations of the practices that produce it. Transformed first by Euclidean geometry and then by descriptive geometry, constituted as a formal ensemble of abstract places, it is a "theater" (as one used to call atlases) in which the same system of projection nevertheless juxtaposes two very different elements: the data furnished by a tradition (Ptolemy's Geography, for instance) and those that came from navigators (portulans, for example). The map thus collates on the same plane heterogeneous places, some received from a tradition and others produced by observation. But the thing important here is the erosion of the itineraries which, presupposing the first category of places and conditioning the second, makes it possible to move from one to the other. The map, a totalizing stage on which elements of diverse origin are brought together to form the tableau of a "state" of geographical knowledge, pushes away into its prehistory or into its posterity, as if into the wings, the operations of which it is the result or the necessary condition. It remains alone on the stage. The tour describers have disappeared.

The organization that can be discerned in stories about space in everyday culture is inverted by the process that has isolated a system of geographical places. The difference between the two modes of description obviously does not consist in the presence or absence of practices (they are at work everywhere), but in the fact that maps, constituted as proper places in which to exhibit the products of knowledge, form tables of legible results. Stories about space exhibit on the contrary the operations that allow it, within a constraining and non-"proper" place, to mingle its elements anyway, as one apartment-dweller put it concerning the rooms in his flat: "One can mix them up" ("On peut les triturer").[14] From the folktale to descriptions of residences, an exacerbation of "practice" ("faire") and thus of enunciation, actuates the stories
narrating tours in places that, from the ancient cosmos to contemporary public housing developments, are all forms of an imposed order.

In a pre-established geography, which extends (if we limit ourselves to the home) from bedrooms so small that "one can't do anything in them" to the legendary, long-lost attic that "could be used for everything," everyday stories tell us what one can do in it and make out of it. They are treatments of space.

Marking out boundaries

As operations on places, stories also play the everyday role of a mobile and magisterial tribunal in cases concerning their delimitation. As always, this role appears more clearly at the second degree, when it is made explicit and duplicated by juridical discourse. In the traditional language of court proceedings, magistrates formerly "visited the scene of the case at issue" ("se transportaient sur les lieux") (transports and juridical metaphors), in order to "hear" the contradictory statements (dits) made by the parties to a dispute concerning debatable boundaries. Their "interlocutory judgment," as it was called, was an "operation of marking out boundaries" (bornage). Written in a beautiful hand by the court clerk on parchments where the writing sometimes flowed into (or was inaugurated by?) drawings outlining the boundaries, these interlocutory judgments were in sum nothing other than meta-stories. They combined together (the work of a scribe collating variants) the opposing stories of the parties involved: "Mr. Mulatier declares that his grandfather planted this apple tree on the edge of his field. . . . Jeanpierre reminds us that Mr. Bouvet maintains a dungheap on a piece of land of which he is supposed to be the joint owner with his brother André. . . ." Genealogies of places, legends about territories. Like a critical edition, the judge's narration reconciles these versions. The narration is "established" on the basis of "primary" stories (those of Mr. Mulatier, Jeanpierre, and so many others), stories that already have the function of spatial legislation since they determine rights and divide up lands by "acts" or discourses about actions (planting a tree, maintaining a dungheap, etc.).

These "operations of marking out boundaries," consisting in narrative contracts and compilations of stories, are composed of fragments drawn from earlier stories and fitted together in makeshift fashion (bricolés). In this sense, they shed light on the formation of myths, since they also have the function of founding and articulating spaces. Preserved in the court records, they constitute an immense travel literature, that is, a literature concerned with actions organizing more or less extensive social cultural areas. But this literature itself represents only a tiny part (the part that is written about disputed points) of the oral narration that interminably labors to compose spaces, to verify, collate, and displace their frontiers.

The ways of "conducting" a story offer, as Pierre Janet pointed out, a very rich field for the analysis of spatiality. Among the questions that depend on it, we should distinguish those that concern dimensions (extensionality), orientation (vectorality), affinity (homographies), etc. I shall stress only a few of its aspects that have to do with delimitation itself, the primary and literally "fundamental" question: it is the partition of space that structures it. Everything refers in fact to this differentiation which makes possible the isolation and interplay of distinct spaces. From the distinction that separates a subject from its exteriority to the distinctions that localize objects, from the home (constituted on the basis of the wall) to the journey (constituted on the basis of a geographical "elsewhere" or a cosmological "beyond"), from the functioning of the urban network to that of the rural landscape, there is no spatiality that is not organized by the determination of frontiers.

In this organization, the story plays a decisive role. It "describes," to be sure. But "every description is more than a fixation," it is "a culturally creative act." It even has distributive power and performative force (it does what it says) when an ensemble of circumstances is brought together. Then it founds spaces. Reciprocally, where stories are disappearing (or else are being reduced to museographical objects), there is a loss of space: deprived of narrations (as one sees it happen in both the city and the countryside), the group or the individual regresses toward the disquieting, fatalistic experience of a formless, indistinct, and nocturnal totality. By considering the role of stories in delimitation, one can see that the primary function is to authorize the establishment, displacement or transcendence of limits, and as a consequence, to set in opposition, within the closed field of discourse, two movements that intersect (setting and transgressing limits) in such a way as to make the story a sort of "crossword" decoding stencil (a dynamic partitioning of space) whose essential narrative figures seem to be the frontier and the bridge.

1. Creating a theater of actions. The story’s first function is to authorize, or more exactly, to found. Strictly speaking, this function is
ize, or more exactly, to found. Strictly speaking, this function is not
juridical, that is, related to laws or judgments. It depends rather on what
Georges Dumézil analyzes in connection with the Indo-European root
dhē, "to set in place," and its derivatives in Sanskrit (dhātu) and Latin
(fās). The Latin noun "fās," he writes, "is properly speaking the mystical
foundation, which is in the invisible world, and without which all forms
of conduct that are enjoined or authorized by ius (human law) and,
more generally speaking, all human conduct, are doubtful, perilous, and
even fatal. Fās cannot be subjected to analysis or casuistry, as ius can.
Fās can no more be broken up into parts than its name can be declined.
A foundation either exists or it doesn't: fās est or fās non est. "A time or
a place are said to be fasti or nefasti [auspicious or inauspicious]
depending on whether they provide or fail to provide human action with
this necessary foundation."18

In the Western parts of the Indo-European world, this function has
been divided in a particular way among different institutions—in contrast
to what happened in ancient India, where different roles were
played in turn by the same characters. Occidental culture created its own
ritual concerning fās, which was carried out in Rome by specialized
priests called fētiāles. It was practiced "before Rome undertook any
action with regard to a foreign nation," such as a declaration of war, a
military expedition, or an alliance. The ritual was a procession with
three centrifugal stages, the first within Roman territory but near the
frontier, the second on the frontier, the third in foreign territory. The
ritual action was carried out before every civil or military action because
it is designed to create the field necessary for political or military
activities. It is thus also a repetitio rerum: both a renewal and a
repetition of the originary founding acts, a recitation and a citation of
the genealogies that could legitimate the new enterprise, and a prediction
and a promise of success at the beginning of battles, contracts, or
conquests. As a general repetition before the actual representation, the
rite, a narration in acts, precedes the historical realization. The tour or
procession of the fētiāles opens a space and provides a foundation for
the operations of the military men, diplomats, or merchants who dare to
cross the frontiers. Similarly in the Vedas, Viṣṇu, "by his footsteps,
opens the zone of space in which Indra's military action must take
place." The fās ritual is a foundation. It "provides space" for the actions
that will be undertaken; it "creates a field" which serves as their "base"
and their "theater."19

This founding is precisely the primary role of the story. It opens a
legitimate theater for practical actions. It creates a field that authorizes
dangerous and contingent social actions. But it differs in three ways
from the function the Roman ritual so carefully isolated: the story
founds fās in a form that is fragmented (not unique and whole),
miniaturized (not on a national scale), and polyvalent (not specialized).
It is fragmented, not only because of the diversification of social milieus,
but especially because of the increasing heterogeneity (or because of a
heterogeneity that is increasingly obvious) of the authorizing "references":
the excommunication of territorial "divinities," the deconsecration of
places haunted by the story-spirit, and the extension of neutral areas
deprived of legitimacy have marked the disappearance and fragmentation
of the narrations that organized frontiers and appropriations. (Official
historiography—history books, television news reports, etc.—nevertheless
tries to make everyone believe in the existence of a national space.) It is
miniaturized, because socioeconomic technocratization confines the sig-
nificance of fās and nefas to the level of the family unit or the
individual, and leads to the multiplication of "family stories," "life
stories," and psychoanalytical narrations. (Gradually cut loose from
these particular stories, public justifications nevertheless continue to exist
in the form of blind rumors, or resurface savagely in class or race
conflicts). It is finally polyvalent, because the mixing together of so
many micro-stories gives them functions that change according to the
groups in which they circulate. This polyvalence does not affect the
relational origins of narrativity, however: the ancient ritual that creates
fields of action is recognizable in the "fragments" of narration planted
around the obscure thresholds of our existence; these buried fragments
articulate without its knowing it the "biographical" story whose space
they found.

A narrative activity, even if it is multiform and no longer unitary, thus
continues to develop where frontiers and relations with space abroad are
concerned. Fragmented and disseminated, it is continually concerned
with marking out boundaries. What it puts in action is once more the
fās that "authorizes" enterprises and precedes them. Like the Roman
fētiāles, stories "go in a procession" ahead of social practices in order to
open a field for them. Decisions and juridical combinations themselves
come only afterwards, like the statements and acts of Roman law (īūs),
arbitrating the areas of action granted to each party,20 participating
themselves in the activities for which fās provided a "foundation."
According to the rules that are proper to them, the magistrates' "interlocutory judgments" operate within the aggregate of heterogeneous spaces that have already been created and established by the innumerable forms of an oral narrativity composed of family or local stories, customary or professional "poems" and "recitations" of paths taken or countrysides traversed. The magistrates' judgments do not create these theaters of action, they articulate and manipulate them. They presuppose the narrative authorities that the magistrates "hear" compare, and put into hierarchies. Preceding the judgment that regulates and settles, there is a founding narration.

2. Frontiers and bridges. Stories are actuated by a contradiction that is represented in them by the relationship between the frontier and the bridge, that is, between a (legitimate) space and its (alien) exteriority. In order to account for contradiction, it is helpful to go back to the elementary units. Leaving aside morphology (which is not our concern here) and situating ourselves in the perspective of a pragmatics and, more precisely, a syntax aimed at determining "programs" or series of practices through which space is appropriated, we can take as our point of departure the "region," which Miller and Johnson-Laird define as a basic unit: the place where programs and actions interact. A "region" is thus the space created by an interaction. It follows that in the same place there are as many "regions" as there are interactions or intersections of programs. And also that the determination of space is dual and operational, and, in a problematics of enunciation, related to an "interlocutory" process.

In this way a dynamic contradiction between each delimitation and its mobility is introduced. On the one hand, the story tirelessly marks out frontiers. It multiplies them, but in terms of interactions among the characters — things, animals, human beings: the acting subjects (actants) divide up among themselves places as well as predicates (simple, crafty, ambitious, silly, etc.) and movements (advancing, withdrawing, going into exile, returning, etc.). Limits are drawn by the points at which the progressive appropriations (the acquisition of predicates in the course of the story) and the successive displacements (internal or external movements) of the acting subjects meet. Both appropriations and displacements depend on a dynamic distribution of possible goods and functions in order to constitute an increasingly complex network of differentiations, a combinative system of spaces. They result from the operation of distinctions resulting from encounters. Thus, in the obscurity of their unlimitedness, bodies can be distinguished only where the "contacts" ("touch") of amorous or hostile struggles are inscribed on them. This is a paradox of the frontier: created by contacts, the points of differentiation between two bodies are also their common points. Conjunction and disjunction are inseparable in them. Of two bodies in contact, which one possesses the frontier that distinguishes them? Neither. Does that amount to saying: no one?

The theoretical and practical problem of the frontier: to whom does it belong? The river, wall or tree makes a frontier. It does not have the character of a nowhere that cartographical representation ultimately presupposes. It has a mediating role. So does the story that gives it voice: "Stop," says the forest the wolf comes out of. "Stop!" says the river, revealing its crocodile. But this actor, by virtue of the very fact that he is the mouthpiece of the limit, creates communication as well as separation; more than that, he establishes a border only by saying what crosses it, having come from the other side. He articulates it. He is also a passing through or over. In the story, the frontier functions as a third element. It is an "in-between" — a "space between," Zwischenraum, as Morgenstern puts it in a marvelous and ironic poem on "closure" (Zaum), which rhymes with "space" (Raum) and "to see through" (hindurchzuschauen). It is the story of a picket fence (Lattenzaun):

Es war einmal ein Lattenzaun mit Zwischenraum, hindurchzuschauen.

One time there was a picket fence with space to gaze from hence to thence.

A middle place, composed of interactions and inter-views, the frontier is a sort of void, a narrative symbol of exchanges and encounters. Passing by, an architect suddenly appropriates this "in-between space" and builds a great edifice on it:

Ein Architekt, der dieses sah, stand eines Abends plötzlich da—
und nahm den Zwischenraum heraus
und baute draus ein grosses Haus.

An architect who saw this sight approached it suddenly one night, removed the spaces from the fence and built them a residence.

Transformation of the void into a plenitude, of the in-between into an established place. The rest goes without saying. The Senate "takes on"
the monument—the Law establishes itself in it—and the architect escapes to Afri-or-America:

Drum zog ihn der Senat auch ein, the senate had to intervene.

Der Architekt jedoch entflo
nach Afri-od-Ameriko

The architect, however, flew to Afri- or America.

(Max Knight, trans.)

The Architect's drive to cement up the picket fence, to fill in and build up "the space in-between," is also his illusion, for without knowing it he is working toward the political freezing of the place and there is nothing left for him to do, when he sees his work finished, but to flee far away from the blocs of the law.

In contrast, the story privileges a "logic of ambiguity" through its accounts of interaction. It "turns" the frontier into a crossing, and the river into a bridge. It recounts inversions and displacements: the door that closes is precisely what may be opened; the river is what makes passage possible; the tree is what marks the stages of advance; the picket fence is an ensemble of interstices through which one's glances pass.

The bridge is ambiguous everywhere: it alternately welds together and opposes insularities. It distinguishes them and threatens them. It liberates from enclosure and destroys autonomy. Thus, for example, it occurs as a central and ambivalent character in the stories of the Noirmoorins, before, during, and after the construction of a bridge between La Fosse and Fromentine in Vendée in 1972. It carries on a double life in innumerable memories of places and everyday legends, often summed up in proper names, hidden paragone, topos, topography, riddles to be solved: Bridgehead, Bridgenorth, Bridgetown, Bridgewater, Bridgman, Cambridge, Trowbridge, etc.

Justifiably, the bridge is the index of the diabolic in the paintings where Bosch invents his modifications of spaces. As a transgression of the limit, a disobedience of the law of the place, it represents a departure, an attack on a state, the ambition of a conquering power, or the flight of an exile; in any case, the "betrayal" of an order. But at the same time as it offers the possibility of a bewildering exteriority, it allows or causes the re-emergence beyond the frontiers of the alien element that was controlled in the interior, and gives ob-jectivity (that is, expression and re-presentation) to the alterity which was hidden inside the limits, so that in recrossing the bridge and coming back within the enclosure the traveler henceforth finds there the exteriority that he had first sought by going outside and then fled by returning. Within the frontiers, the alien is already there, an exoticism or sabbath of the memory, a disquieting familiarity. It is as though delimitation itself were the bridge that opens the inside to its other.

Delinquencies?

What the map cuts up, the story cuts across. In Greek, narration is called "diegesis": it establishes an itinerary (it "guides") and it passes through (it "transgresses"). The space of operations it travels in is made of movements: it is topological, concerning the deformations of figures, rather than topical, defining places. It is only ambivalently that the limit circumscribes in this space. It plays a double game. It does the opposite of what it says. It hands the place over to the foreigner that it gives the impression of throwing out. Or rather, when it marks a stopping place, the latter is not stable but follows the variations of encounters between programs. Boundaries are transportable limits and transportations of limits; they are also metaphorai.

In the narrations that organize spaces, boundaries seem to play the role of the Greek xoanai, statues whose invention is attributed to the clever Daedalus: they are crafty like Daedalus and mark out limits only by moving themselves (and the limits). These straight-line indicators put emphasis on the curves and movements of space. Their distributive work is thus completely different from that of the divisions established by poles, pickets or stable columns which, planted in the earth, cut up and compose an order of places. They are also transportable limits.

Today, narrative operations of boundary-setting take the place of these enigmatic describers of earlier times when they bring movement in through the very act of fixing, in the name of delimitation. Michelet already said it: when the aristocracy of the great Olympian gods collapsed at the end of Antiquity, it did not take down with it "the mass of indigenous gods, the populace of gods that still possessed the immensity of fields, forests, woods, mountains, springs, intimately associated with the life of the country. These gods lived in the hearts of oaks, in the swift, deep waters, and could not be driven out of them.... Where are they? In the desert, on the heath, in the forest? Yes, but also and especially in the home. They live on in the most intimate of domestic habits." But they also live on in our streets and in our apartments. They were perhaps after all only the agile representatives of narrativity,
and of narrativity in its most delinquent form. The fact that they have changed their names (every power is toponymical and initiates its order of places by naming them) takes nothing away from the multiplicity, insidious, moving force. It survives the avatars of the great history that debaptises and rebaptises them.

If the delinquent exists only by displacing itself, if its specific mark is to live not on the margins but in the interstices of the codes that it undoes and displaces, if it is characterized by the privilege of the tour over the state, then the story is delinquent. Social delinquency consists in taking the story literally, in making it the principle of physical existence where a society no longer offers to subjects or groups symbolic outlets and expectations of spaces, where there is no longer any alternative to disciplinary falling-into-line or illegal drifting away, that is, one form or another of prison and wandering outside the pale. Inversely, the story is a sort of delinquency in reserve, maintained, but itself displaced and consistent, in traditional societies (ancient, medieval, etc.), with an order that is firmly established but flexible enough to allow the proliferation of this challenging mobility that does not respect places, is alternately playful and threatening, and extends from the microbe-like forms of everyday narration to the carnivalesque celebrations of earlier days.  

It remains to be discovered, of course, what actual changes produce this delinquent narrativity in a society. In any event, one can already say that in matters concerning space, this delinquency begins with the inscriptions of the body in the order's text. The opacity of the body in movement, gesticulating, walking, taking its pleasure, is what indefinitely organizes a here in relation to an abroad, a "familiarity" in relation to a "foreignness." A spatial story is in its minimal degree a spoken language, that is, a linguistic system that distributes places insofar as it is articulated by an "enunciatory focalization," by an act of practicing it. It is the object of "proxemics." Before we return to its manifestations in the organization of memory, it will suffice here to recall that, in this focalizing enunciation, space appears once more as a practiced place.

**Part IV**

**Uses of Language**

**Chapter X**  
**The Scriptural Economy**

"Only words that stride onward, passing from mouth to mouth, legends and songs, keep a people alive"  
N. F. S. Grundtvig

The dedication to Grundtvig, the Danish poet and prophet whose pathways all lead toward "the living word" (det levende ord), the Grail of orality, authorizes today, as the Muses did in earlier ages, a quest for lost and ghostly voices in our "scriptural" societies. I am trying to hear these fragile ways in which the body makes itself heard in the language, the multiple voices set aside by the triumphal conquista of the economy that has, since the beginning of the "modern age" (i.e., since the seventeenth or eighteenth century), given itself the name of writing. My subject is orality, but an orality that has been changed by three or four centuries of Western fashioning. We no longer believe, as Grundtvig (or Michelet) did, that, behind the doors of our cities, in the nearby distance of the countryside, there are vast poetic and "pagan" pastures where one can still hear songs, myths, and the spreading murmur of the folkelighed (a Danish word that cannot be translated: it means "what belongs to the people"). These voices can no longer be heard except within the interior of the scriptural systems where they recur. They move about, like dancers, passing lightly through the field of the other.

The installation of the scriptural apparatus of modern "discipline," a process that is inseparable from the "reproduction" made possible by the
7. “Mémoire,” in the ancient sense of the term, which designates a presence to the plurality of times and is thus not limited to the past.
8. Expressions in quotation marks in this section are from Détéenne and Vernant, Les Rues de l’intelligence, 23–25.
12. See below, Part IV, Uses of Language.
13. See below, and also above in Chapter II, p. 22.

7. “Walking in the City”

4. D. P. Schreber, Mémoires d’un névropathe (Paris: Seuil, 1975), 41, 60, etc.
5. Descartes, in his Regulae, had already made the blind man the guarantor of the knowledge of things and places against the illusions and deceptions of vision.
8. Urbanistic techniques, which classify things spatially, can be related to the tradition of the “art of memory”: see Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966). The ability to produce a spatial organization of knowledge (with “places” assigned to each type of “figure” or “function”) develops its procedures on the basis of this “art.” It determines utopias and can be recognized even in Bentham’s Panopticon. Such a form remains stable in spite of the diversity of its contents (past, future, present) and its projects (conserving or creating) relative to changes in the status of knowledge.

15. R. Barthes, quoted in S. Soucy, L’Image du centre, 10.
19. See Paul Lemaire’s analyses, Les Signes sauvages. Une Philosophie du langage ordinaire (Ottawa: Université d’Ottawa et Université Saint-Paul, 1981, in particular the introduction.
25. In his analysis of culinary practices, P. Bourdieu regards as decisive not the ingredients but the way in which they are prepared and used: “Le Sens pratique,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, February 1976, 77.
27. On the “theory of the proper,” see J. Derrida, Marges de la philosophie
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50. See note 48.
51. See the two analyses provided by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams and Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. J. Strachey (New York: Liveright, 1980); and also Sami-Ali, L’Espace imaginaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), 42–64.

9. “Spatial Stories”

3. See below, p. 118.
9. See, for example, Catherine Bidou and Francis Ho Tham Kouie, Le Vécu des habitants dans leur logement à travers soixante entretiens libres (Paris: CEREBE, 1974); Alain Médam and Jean-François Augoyard, Situations d’habitat et façons d’habiter (Paris: ESA, 1976), etc.
10. See George H. T. Kimble, Geography in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 1938); etc.
12. The map is reproduced and analyzed by Pierre Janet, L’Évolution de la mémoire et la notion du temps (Paris: Chahine, 1928), 284–287. The original is
in Cuauhtinchan (Puebla, Mexico).

13. See, for example, Louis Marin, *Utopiques: Jeux d'espaces* (Paris: Minuit, 1973), 257–290, on the relation between figures (a "discourse-tour") and the map (a "system-text") in three representations of the city in the seventeenth century: a relation between a "narrative" and a "geometric."


15. Ibid., 57 and 59.

16. Janet, *L'Evolution de la mémoire*, particularly the lectures on "the procedures of narrative" and "fabrication" (249–294). Médam and Augoyard have used this unit to define the subject matter of their investigation (*Situations d'habitat*, 90–95).


19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 31–45.


10. "The Scriptural Economy"


7. See Lucette Finas, *La Crue* (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), preface, on the reading that is an inscription of the text on the body.


10. Jean-Pierre Peter, "Le Corps du délit," *Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse*, No. 3 (1971), 71–108: the three successive figures of the body distinguished by Peter could be related to the three paradigms from physics of which they are variants and applications, namely, the physics of impacts (seventeenth century), the physics of action at a distance (eighteenth century) and thermodynamics (nineteenth century).


19. See *The Interpretation of Dreams* (**Die Traumdeutung**), Chapter VII, on