Introduction

No matter why you have chosen to pick up this book, *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* will help you approach professional writing with greater rhetorical awareness, sensitivity, and effectiveness. It does so through the voices of professionals in the field. There are any number of books to choose from if you are looking for a summary of issues in the field, or if you are looking for an introductory handbook to professional writing. These books are excellent choices if you are looking for summaries and handbooks. But if you are interested in becoming part of the disciplinary and professional conversations of the field, *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* is a good choice. The readings in this collection are written *by* professional writers *for* professional writers. Together, they form a framework for making sense of professional writing as a field, and thus they help you become part of the field's conversations.

You might worry that such a selection of readings will go over your head. Though I am confident you will find most of the readings challenging and engaging, I am also confident you will not find yourself lost. Overall, the readings have been carefully chosen and reviewed by other professionals in the field to give you an introduction that offers appropriate introductory breadth and depth. This does not mean you will find the readings easy, nor that the readings will provide you clear, uncomplicated answers to questions and issues professional writers face. On the contrary, the aim of the readings, individually and collectively, is to invite you into the ongoing conversations that make up the field of professional writing. Such conversations are necessarily complex and difficult, as is the work of professional writers. Still, the readings have been chosen, in part, because they make up an appropriate introduction for someone relatively new to the field.

In addition to reading, you are invited into this professional conversation through a variety of writing activities. Before each reading, you will find a list of terms and concepts. You are encouraged to define these terms and concepts as you read, as a way to become more comfortable with some of the jargon that defines the discipline. At the end of each reading, you will find a list of questions designed to help you make sense of the reading you have just completed. Some of the questions will help you increase your comprehension of the articles, but many others direct you to produce documents and presentations that a professional writer might be asked to produce. Through both kinds of writing activities, you become more conversant with the field. Finally, at the end of each chapter, you will find projects that help you make

connections across the readings of each chapter. Most of these projects give you a chance to produce the kinds of oral and/or written documents a professional writer might produce, and a number of them will also require you to apply what you have learned from the readings. In all of these ways, *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* helps you enter the conversation of the field no matter what your past experience has been.

GETTING ORIENTED: *PROFESSIONAL WRITING AND RHETORIC* RESPONDS TO BROAD ISSUES IN THE FIELD

Professional Writing and Rhetoric does not pretend to be an objective summary of the field. Like the readings that make up its contents, this book is a part of the field's ongoing conversations. Though the book attempts to be as representative as possible of the issues that define the field, it is still a response to other conversations. In general, *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* responds to three dominant binaries or dichotomies with which not only professional writing but also higher education in general wrestles: practice vs. theory, production vs. practice, and school vs. work.

Practice vs. Theory

Professional writing courses, often carrying titles like Technical Writing, Writing for the Professions, and Business Communication, have traditionally emphasized practice over theory. Perhaps this is so because of their historical growth, developing largely out of requests from engineering and business schools to improve the communication skills of their students. Instruction in these courses focused almost entirely on *how-to* knowledge often taught as acontextual rules or generic forms. Students would practice writing memos, reports, instructions, etc., and even if these assignments were contextualized within cases, assignments routinely asked students to respond in formulaic ways (e.g., "Based on X case, write an effective bad news letter"). The aim of the course work was to give students *practice* in writing workplace documents. In such a course, it made little sense to introduce students to theoretical discussions surrounding effective communication because formalized practice requires no theorizing from the writer. By its nature, formalized practice simply requires that you master a variety of generalized response structures and skills and then practice adapting them to particular communicative situations.

A growing number of professional writing courses, though, have begun introducing students to theories of writing and rhetoric. This change has occurred for a variety of reasons more numerous and complex than can be fully explored here. For instance, the change has been driven by pedagogy as course work in professional writing classes has become more contextualized in cases and especially client-based projects. Placed within specific rhetorical situations, students (and the instructors facilitating students' learning) discover that formulaic responses are rarely effective. Writers find themselves asking questions that require them to theorize on the spot about what defines effective communication in the particular scenarios within which they find themselves. In order to engage in this context-specific action—the theorizing required of effective writers—students must have some familiarity with theoretical conversations in writing and rhetoric.

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The increased need to introduce students to theories of writing and rhetoric has also been driven by contextual changes in workplace writing. For instance, along with the rapid growth in technology, came an increased demand for writers and people capable of examining issues from rhetorical/communicative perspectives. More and more writers were needed to develop the documents that would help people and machines work together. That is, as technological development exploded, there arose a great demand for communicators who could help people use these technologies and also help product developers design technologies that best met user needs. These writers needed to do more than simply adapt basic rhetorical principles and generic forms to new situations. They needed theories of writing and rhetoric to help them work through the communicative issues they faced in a host of new contexts.

At the same time that the technological explosion was creating these needs for writers, it was also creating an explosion in communication media. The old job title of "technical writer" has exploded right along with new media, creating a variety of new job titles, like Web author, document designer, information engineer, electronic publications manager, and human-centered designer. The expanded role of the professional writer caused, to a great extent, by technological growth required the writer to be able to theorize a whole new set of issues. These include issues like how are the visual and textual interrelated, how do dynamic texts like Web pages and databases affect how we write, and how is the collaborative writing process common in the workplace best managed when it is done largely across computer networks. These, again, were not issues where practice alone could prepare writers. The context encouraged the inclusion of more theory into professional writing courses.

But theory alone is not enough. *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* assumes that theory and practice should not be separated from one another: good practice requires theoretical knowledge, and good theorizing is not only itself a practice but it also requires an awareness of and responsiveness to practice. Many of the readings in this collection are theoretical, but the assignments and projects accompanying them direct you to make connections across theory and practice. *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* assumes that making such connections—from theories to practices and from practices to theories—greatly defines professional writing expertise. It is the ability to *theorize* effectively within particular rhetorical situations that makes a professional writer truly expert.

Production vs. Practice

The dominant perception of writing in both lay populations as well as scholarly ones considers writing an art of production, or a way of making texts. This perception becomes obvious in the ways that writers are defined. When someone asks a writer, "What do you do?" writers often respond with statements like, "I write grants," or "computer instructions," or "scientific articles." And at times when people meet a writer, they often react with such questions as "Oh, so do you write novels?" These examples illustrate that writers are often defined by the products they produce.

What gets lost in this definition is all of the *activity* that surrounds the production of texts, the very *social activity* that writing requires. Being a professional writer requires much more than simply sitting alone at a desk crafting neat sentences. But be-

cause of the ways writing is over-defined by its products—documents—it is often misunderstood as this solitary act of textual production. Some kinds of writing lend themselves to more solitary activity, for sure, but even in such cases, there is a great deal of (inter)action. The writer interacts with language, which is socially invented. The writer's text interacts with previous, current, and future texts both written and spoken, a relationship often called intertextuality. The writer is even interacting with readers, though they may be referred to as invoked or imagined. So, even in what looks like the most solitary situation, writers are constantly interacting. Especially in workplaces, interactions are much more visible and physical. Writers make calls, talk with others, observe people interacting with texts and products, gather to meet in conference rooms both physical and virtual, test the effectiveness of their documents, manage others involved with document production, and interact with a variety of communication technologies. Perceived this way, the work of writing clearly extends beyond its textual products, correcting the misperception that writing is a solitary act of textual production.

An exclusive focus on the products of writing not only hides the social interaction that is integral to writing, but it also clouds the nature of texts or documents as forms of social action or means by which we mediate social interaction. When we write, we are choosing one medium of action. We could stand up and shout, or we could speak, or we could move, or we could act in a variety of other ways. But we choose to act through writing. To understand this nature of texts, we could consider a document like a summons. Is a summons just an isolated product that takes on no action in the world? Obviously not. It is a text that takes up the action of summoning another party to act in a particular fashion. The document is a form of social action itself, apart from the writer. Also, no matter how beautifully a summons might be written—that is, no matter how wonderful the "product"—if it fails to summon, to act, then it certainly cannot be considered a successful document. Though product features are important to defining good writing, they cannot fully define what it means to write and write well.

Professional Writing and Rhetoric takes the position that writing is both practice and production. There is no doubt that when we write, we produce texts; and there is a great deal that writers must know about the arts of production, or *technē*. This book addresses production in Part 3, focusing on issues of production that are both particular to professional writing and often overlooked as products of writers' work. But, *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* also assumes that writing is a form of social action. As such, it happens within social contexts and has ethical consequences. Part 2 focuses on professional writing as a form of social practice, examining the contextual and ethical issues particular to the field.

School vs. Work

Like all forms of professional education, the field of professional writing often faces questions about the role course work plays in the development of the writer, as well as the role course work plays in the definition of what professional writing is. If we were to create two poles that define this binary, on one side would be the statement that school should train writers for the workplace and on the other side would be the statement that the workplace ought to reflect what is taught in school.

Professional Writing and Rhetoric takes the position that neither side of this binary is possible nor preferable. School cannot reproduce workplace contexts and, thus, "train" students for workplace writing. At the same time, the workplace reflects a very different context than school and, thus, carries with it a different set of values and purposes. As a result, the workplace cannot simply reflect school. Still, these differences do not mean that school and work are completely unrelated.

A majority of the readings illustrate how rhetorical reasoning interacts with and becomes a part of organizational contexts and scenarios. In no instance will you find one of the following happening: (1) the workplace has a ready-made answer to which the writer adapts or (2) school offers a ready-made answer that the writer simply imports into the workplace. What you will find is that workplace cultures and contexts both exert influence on and are influenced by the rhetorical knowledge writers bring with them from other contexts, including school. This interaction is exciting. It means that what you learn in school can help you shape the way writing and work get done in the workplace. It also means that what you and others learn and experience in the workplace, through internships, for instance, have a significant impact on formal education.

UNDERSTANDING PROFESSIONAL WRITING AS ORGANIZATIONALLY SITUATED AUTHORSHIP

As you can see from even the brief discussion that preceded, professional writing is much more than simply transferring writing skills from school to the workplace. Professional writing is a complex rhetorical act that, if done with expertise, requires a writer to theorize within a wide variety of rhetorical situations. The readings collected in *Professional Writing and Rhetoric*, along with their accompanying assignments and projects, come together to formulate a definition of professional writing as what might be called "organizationally situated authorship," a definition that is meant both to encourage a view of professional writing as rhetorical and to capture the breadth of the professional writer's role.

The three terms that make up the phrase "organizationally situated authorship" are chosen with care and complexly interrelated. However, they require careful "unpacking." For instance, in what ways are the professional writer and the texts produced by the writer organizationally situated? Is there a single, concrete situation that defines the context of the professional writer's work, or might there be multiple situations that are concrete, imaginative, and/or virtual? What is the difference between "authorship" and "situated authorship"? Why use "authorship" at all? In what ways are professional writers understood and treated differently when they are referred to as (and refer to themselves as) authors instead of writers? If professional writers are authors, what kinds of things do they author? These are just a few of the questions the phrase "organizationally situated authorship" provokes.

As stated earlier, *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* is itself a part of the ongoing conversations that are creating the field of professional writing. As part of these ongoing conversations, the book indirectly interjects the following question: "Does the concept of 'organizationally situated authorship,' if understood broadly, effectively capture the scope of the professional writer's work?" In addition to exploring the wide

variety of questions and projects you will find throughout this book, return repeatedly to this question that the whole book poses. Throughout the readings, introductions, assignments, and projects, *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* invites you to take an active role in exploring and shaping the field. By repeatedly returning your thoughts and class discussion to this one overarching question, you are perhaps exploring one of the most crucial questions for yourself and the field: Who are you as a professional writer?

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PART 1

Defining the Field

Chapters 1 and 2 have been designed to answer some of the primary questions you might have as you begin studying professional writing and rhetoric. The later chapters examine finer issues related to the field, but to prepare you to engage in these finer issues, Part 1 introduces some of the main issues that set the framework for studying the field of professional writing and rhetoric.

The first questions you might have are "What do professional writers do?" and "Where do they work?" The range of contexts in which professional writers might work is extensive. Any list would be incomplete, but the contexts include business, engineering, computer industries, environmental sciences, medicine and health care, government, social service, nonprofit organizations, advertising, marketing, publishing, and graphic design. Even this list is woefully incomplete. The task of introducing you to what professional writers do and where they work, though, exceeds the focus and length of this book. If you want to explore these questions further, you can find them in several fine books, such as *The Practice of Technical and Scientific Communication: Writing in Professional Contexts* (Jean A. Lutz and C. Gilbert Storms), *Writing a Professional Life: Stories of Technical Communicators On and Off the Job* (Gerald J. Savage and Dale L. Sullivan), and *Careers for Writers & Others Who Have a Way with Words* (Robert W. Bly). You may find one or more of these books a helpful supplement to this text.

Once you have a good sense of where professional writers work and what they do, which many of you probably already have, you will probably wonder, "What is rhetoric?" Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to rhetoric. For those who do not have a background in this ancient discipline, the chapter gives you a brief glimpse. It is assumed, though, that you have already had a course or several courses in rhetoric or that your course instructor will supplement what is presented in Chapter 1 with further instructions and possibly readings. In the first case, Chapter 1 serves as a brief warm-up to get you reflecting and talking. In the second case, Chapter 1 sets a foundation upon which your instructor can build. In either case, Chapter 1 introduces you to some of the key rhetorical issues that are discussed throughout this book.

Chapter 2 takes up the question, "What is the relationship between professional writing and rhetoric?" Implicitly, this is where *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* constructs

a framework for understanding the work of professional writers as "organizationally situated authorship." Rhetoric has long studied and strategized speaking and writing within specific contexts or rhetorical situations. When professional writing and rhetoric are brought together, rhetoric's specialized knowledge of authoring within specific rhetorical situations is carried, more generally, into the organizational contexts in which professional writers work. Chapter 2 examines how this joining of rhetoric and professional writing affects the ways we understand professional writing (and even rhetoric).

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CHAPTER 1

What Is Rhetoric?

INTRODUCTION

Having picked up a book on professional writing *and rhetoric*, you are most likely wondering, "What is rhetoric?" Most people have heard the term used in public discourse, but from what we hear on the news and in the newspapers, rhetoric typically carries negative connotations. When we recall the term being used, we recall politicians whose "mere rhetoric" is just a bunch of smoke and mirrors to misdirect us. Is this the extent of what rhetoric is?

Together, the readings in Chapter 1 focus on the following questions, helping you make better sense of rhetoric:

- How is rhetoric defined?
- What fields is it related to?
- What is its history?
- What is the purpose or function of rhetoric?
- What is its scope, or what kinds of issues does it address?

It's no doubt that a small selection of readings cannot adequately introduce to you a discipline like rhetoric, a discipline with such a long and dynamic history. But these readings can help you get a taste of its breadth, scope, history, and function.

You may still be wondering, though, "Why should I be concerned about rhetoric at all?" In order for you to understand how professional writing and rhetoric are related, you must first understand what rhetoric is on its own terms, which are quite extensive and complicated.

One issue you should pay attention to as you read the selections in Chapter 1 is the relationship between rhetoric, philosophy, ethics, and politics. Is rhetoric completely separate from these other disciplines? If so, is it possible and appropriate for a rhetor—one who practices rhetoric, either through speaking or writing—to employ rhetoric without any concern for ethics? Or, is it possible and effective for a rhetor to employ rhetoric without considering the political context? Looking at it in a different way, if rhetoric is a separate discipline entirely, does the definition, scope, and practice of rhetoric remain constant despite ethical, political, and philosophical changes between cultures and across histories, or is rhetoric rhetoric?

These issues may seem "merely academic" to you as they are presented here, but in professional writing contexts, they become "very real." For instance, let us imagine

that you are a professional writer for a cigarette company and you have been asked to be the lead writer on a report arguing that studies on cigarette smoking show no direct relationship between smoking and heart disease. In one of the first meetings you have with your supervisors, you ask about some of the studies you have seen in- and out-of-house that seem to contradict the message you are being asked to forward. Your supervisors off-handedly discount those sources and rather abruptly suggest that your job is to "write an effective report," not to initiate your own research into the matter. In this scenario do you see any overlap between rhetoric/writing and ethics? Or do you see these as two separate disciplines? Can you "write an effective report" without addressing ethical issues within the scenario? By examining the nature of rhetoric, Chapter 1 helps you to begin formulating responses to these and many other challenging questions that arise in professional writing and rhetoric.

Rhetoric is not a discipline that has stood still over time. Formalized in ancient Greece, rhetoric has had a dynamic history. Rhetoricians—those who study and teach rhetoric—have long argued what rhetoric is, what knowledge it requires, and how one gains such knowledge. The first reading by Foss, Foss, and Trapp introduces you to some of the history of this dynamic discipline.

The second reading is the opening to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, arguably one of the most influential classical theories of rhetoric. In his typical way of analyzing and categorizing objects of study, Aristotle defines quite clearly the scope and function of rhetoric. At the same time that his categorizing clearly marks a field of study and practice, it also raises questions about the effectiveness of such boundary setting. The third reading, also from Aristotle but from his *Nicomachean Ethics*, gives you a foundation for exploring the distinction Aristotle makes between science, art, and practical wisdom. It has been vigorously debated whether rhetoric is a science, art, or practice. Some of the fuel for this debate is found in the first line of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the second reading in this chapter, and briefly summarized in the introductory pages coming before George Kennedy's translation of Aristotle's text. As a student of professional writing and rhetoric, you need to explore where you stand on the categorization of rhetoric, for where you categorize rhetoric has a great impact on the scope, function, and practice of writing and rhetoric.

The final reading in the chapter comes from Roman times and is often attributed to Cicero, though this connection is not certain and even argued by many to be unfounded. This piece is interesting and important for a variety of reasons. For one, it is interesting to see how Aristotle's categorizing of rhetoric changes over time. Do you see the boundaries getting more or less sharp, for instance? It is also interesting because reading both Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* gives us some comparative historical perspective on what rhetoric *is* or *becomes* in different cultures and historical contexts. This is an issue raised in the first reading in the chapter by Foss, Foss, and Trapp. This reading also introduces a clear discussion of the five canons of rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. These are just a few of the key rhetorical issues and conversations that you must be aware of and wrestle with in order to effectively enter the conservations in the field.

FOCUSING ON KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Focus on the following terms and concepts while you read through this selection. Understanding these will not only increase your understanding of the selection that follows, but you will find that, because most of these terms or concepts are commonly used in professional writing and rhetoric, understanding them helps you get a better sense of the field itself.

1. sophists
2. second sophistic
3. rhetorical canons
4. epistemological rhetoric
5. belletristic rhetoric
6. elocutionary rhetoric

PERSPECTIVES ON THE STUDY OF RHETORIC

SONJA K. FOSS, KAREN A. FOSS, ROBERT TRAPP

When we hear the word "rhetoric" used today, the meaning frequently is pejorative. More often than not, it refers to talk without action, empty words with no substance, or flowery, ornamental speech. A typical use of the term occurred at one point during the Iranian hostage crisis. When Iranian authorities asserted that the hostages might have been released from the embassy had the deposed shah of Iran remained in Panama to face extradition proceedings, a senior White House aide responded to these assertions by saying, "that sort of promise is little more than rhetoric from people who have made commitments in the past and who have been unwilling or unable to keep those commitments."[1]

Rhetoric should not engender, however, only negative connotations for us. In the Western tradition, rhetoric has a long and distinguished history as an art dating back to classical Greece and Rome. Although our focus in this book is on contemporary treatments of rhetoric, we will begin with a general overview of the rhetorical tradition. We hope this brief review will dispel the disparaging meanings associated with the term "rhetoric" and provide a foundation for understanding the contemporary perspectives explored in later chapters.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF RHETORICAL THOUGHT

The art of rhetoric is said to have originated in the fifth century B.C. with Corax of Syracuse. A revolution on Syracuse, a Greek colony on the island of Sicily, in about 465 B.C., was the catalyst for the formal study of rhetoric. When the tyrannical dictators

[1] Terence Smith, "U.S. Aides Discount Teheran Rhetoric," *New York Times*, March 25, 1980, p. 9.

on the island were overthrown and a democracy was established, the courts were deluged with conflicting property claims: was the rightful owner of a piece of land its original owner or the one who had been given the land during the dictator's reign? The Greek legal system required that citizens represent themselves in court—they could not hire attorneys to speak on their behalf as we can today. The burden, then, was on the claimants in these land disputes to make the best possible case and to present it persuasively to the jury.

Corax realized the need for systematic instruction in the art of speaking in the law courts and wrote a treatise called the "Art of Rhetoric." Although no copies of this work survive, we know from later writers that the notion of probability was central to his rhetorical system. He believed that a speaker must argue from general probabilities or establish probable conclusions when matters of fact cannot be established with absolute certainty. He also showed that probability can be used regardless of the side argued. For instance, to argue that someone convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol probably is guilty if arrested for a second time on the same charge is an argument from probability. But so is the opposing argument—that the person convicted once will be especially cautious and probably will not get into that same situation again. In addition to the principle of probability, Corax contributed the first formal treatment of the organization of speeches. He argued that speeches consist of three major parts—an introduction, an argument or proof, and a conclusion—an arrangement that was elaborated on by later writers about rhetoric.[2]

Corax's pupil, Tisias, is credited with introducing Corax's rhetorical system to mainland Greece. With the coming of rhetorical instruction to Athens and the emerging belief that eloquence was an art that could be taught, the rise of a class of teachers of rhetoric, called sophists, was only natural. The word *sophos* means knowledge or wisdom, so a sophist was essentially a teacher of wisdom. Sophistry, not unlike rhetoric, has a tarnished reputation, so that today we associate the sophists with fallacious or devious reasoning.

The Greeks' distrust of the sophists was due to several factors. First, the sophists were itinerant professors and often foreigners to Athens, and some distrust existed simply because of their foreign status. They also professed to teach wisdom or excellence, a virtue that traditionally the Greeks believed could not be taught. In addition, the sophists charged for their services, a practice not only at odds with tradition, but one that made sophistic education a luxury that could not be afforded by all. This in itself may have generated some ill feelings. In large part, however, the continuing condemnation accorded the sophists can be attributed to an accident of history—the survival of Plato's dialogues. Plato, to whom we will return shortly, stood in adamant opposition to the sophists, and several of his dialogues make the sophists look silly indeed.[3] While Plato's views now are considered unjustified in

[2] George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 58–61; and Bromley Smith, "Corax and Probability," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 7 (February 1921), 13–42.

[3] Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, pp. 13–15; and Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, *Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal* (New York: Ronald, 1948), pp. 36–37.

large part, an anti-sophistic sentiment nevertheless was perpetuated in his dialogues that has continued to the present day.[4]

Protagoras of Abdera (c. 480–411 B.C.) is called the initiator of the sophistic movement. He is remembered for the statement, "Man is the measure of all things," which indicates the interest the sophists as a group placed on the study of humanity as the perspective from which to approach the world. This phrase also suggests the relative position many of the sophists accorded to truth: absolute truth was unknowable and perhaps nonexistent and had to be established in each individual case.[5] A second sophist deserving of mention is Gorgias, who was the subject of one of Plato's disparaging dialogues on the sophists and their brand of rhetoric. Originally from Sicily, Gorgias established a school of rhetoric in Athens and became known for his emphasis on the poetic dimensions of language. He also is called the father of impromptu speaking because this was a favored technique at his school.[6]

Another sophist whose work is significant in the history of rhetorical thought is Isocrates (436–338 B.C.). He began his career as a speechwriter for those involved in state affairs because he lacked the voice and nerve to speak in public. In 392 B.C., he established a school of rhetoric in Athens and advocated as an ideal the orator active in public life. He believed that politics and rhetoric could not be separated; both disciplines were needed for participation in the life of the state. In addition, unlike many other teachers of his day, Isocrates encouraged his students to learn from other teachers—to take instruction with those best qualified to teach them.[7]

The sophists' emphasis on technique suggests that rhetoric had not yet achieved formal status as an area of study. The work of the Greek philosopher, Plato (427–347 B.C.), provided the foundation for such developments, although paradoxically, he also is remembered as one of the great opponents of rhetoric. Plato was a wealthy Athenian who rejected the ideal of political involvement in favor of philosophy after the death of his teacher and mentor, Socrates. At his school, the Academy, he espoused a belief in philosophical thought and knowledge, or dialectic, and rejected any form of relative knowledge or opinions as unreal. Thus, he opposed the practical and relative nature of rhetoric advocated by the sophists.

The two dialogues in which Plato's views on rhetoric emerge most clearly are the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*. In the *Gorgias*, Plato set Gorgias and others against Socrates in order to distinguish true from false rhetoric, or the rhetoric as practiced by the sophists from an ideal rhetoric grounded in philosophy. Plato faulted rhetoric for ignoring true knowledge; for failing to work toward the good, which for Plato was the end toward which all human pursuits should be directed; and because it was a tech-

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[4] That Plato's negative view of the sophists was unjustified has been asserted by numerous scholars. His views in the *Gorgias*, in particular, have come under frequent re-examination. See, for example, Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Gorgias on Rhetoric and Poetic: A Rehabilitation," *Southern Speech Communication Journal*, 38 (Fall 1972), 27–38; and Richard Leo Enos, "The Epistemology of Gorgias' Rhetoric: A Re-examination," *Southern Speech Communication Journal*, 42 (Fall 1976), 35–51.

[5] Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 13; and Philip Wheelwright, *The Presocratics* (Indianapolis: Odyssey, 1966), pp. 238–40.

[6] Thonssen and Baird, p. 38

[7] Russel H . Wagner, "The Rhetorical Theory of Isocrates," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 8 (November 1922), 323–37; and William L. Benoit, "Isocrates on Rhetorical Education," *Communication Education*, 33 (April 1984), 109–20.

nique or knack rather than an art: "[R]hetoric seems not to be an artistic pursuit at all, but that of a shrewd, courageous spirit which is naturally clever at dealing with men; and I call the chief part of it flattery. It seems to me to have many branches and one of them is cookery, which is thought to be an art, but according to my notion is no art at all, but a knack and a routine."[8]

In Plato's later dialogue, the *Phaedrus*, he used three speeches on love as analogies for his ideas about rhetoric. The first two speeches illustrate the faults of rhetoric as practiced in contemporary Athens: either it fails to move listeners at all or it appeals to evil or base motives. With the third speech, however, which Plato had Socrates deliver, he articulated an ideal rhetoric. It is based first and foremost on knowing the truth and the nature of the human soul: "any man who does not know the truth, but has only gone about chasing after opinions, will produce an art of speech which will seem not only ridiculous, but no art at all."[9] In addition to his concern for content, Plato also commented on organization, style, and delivery in the *Phaedrus*, thus paving the way for a comprehensive treatment of all areas of rhetoric.

Plato's student, Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), was responsible for first systematizing rhetoric into a unified body of thought. In fact, his *Rhetoric* often is considered the foundation of the discipline of speech communication. While Aristotle could not avoid the influence of Plato's ideas, he diverged significantly from his teacher in his treatise on rhetoric.

Aristotle was a scientist trained in classification, and this orientation emerges in the *Rhetoric*. Rather than attempting a moral treatise on the subject, as did Plato, Aristotle sought to categorize objectively the various facets of rhetoric, which he defined as "the faculty of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion."[10] The result was a philosophic and pragmatic treatise that drew upon Plato's ideas as well as on the sophistic tradition.

Aristotle devoted a large portion of the *Rhetoric* to invention, or the finding of materials and modes of proof to use in presenting those materials to an audience. He dealt as well, however, with style, organization, and delivery, or the pragmatic processes of presentation. Thus, he incorporated what now are considered to be the major canons of rhetoric that have formed the parameters of its study for centuries. The canons consist of invention, or the discovery of ideas and arguments; organization, or the arrangement of the ideas discovered by means of invention; elocution or style, which involves the linguistic choices a speaker must make; and delivery, or the presentation of the speech. Memory is the fifth canon, although Aristotle made no mention of it.

No major rhetorical treatises survived in the two hundred years after Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. This was a time of increasing Roman power in the Mediterranean, and not surprising, the next extant work on rhetoric was a Latin text, the *Ad Herennium*, written about 100 B.C. The Romans were borrowers and, as with most other aspects of Greek culture, they adopted the basic principles of rhetoric developed by the Greeks.

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[8] Plato, *Gorgias* 463.

[9] Plato, *Phaedrus* 262.

[10] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.2 1355b. For a comparison of the rhetorics of Aristotle and Plato, see Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," in *Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), pp. 3–60.

The Romans were practical people, however, and the more pragmatic aspects of rhetoric were the ones that appealed most to them. They added little that was new to the study of rhetoric but rather organized and refined it as a practical art.

The *Ad Herennium* appears to be a representative Roman text in that it is essentially Greek in content and Roman in form. A discussion of the five canons constitute the essence of this schoolboys' manual, but the practical aspects, not their theoretical underpinnings, are featured. The systematization and categorization that characterized the *Ad Herennium's* approach to rhetoric were typical of the Roman treatises that followed.[11]

Cicero (106–43 B.C.) represents the epitome of Roman rhetoric, since in addition to writing on the art of rhetoric, he was himself a great orator. His earliest treatise on the subject was *De Inventione* (87 B.C.), which he wrote when only twenty years old. Although he considered it an immature piece in comparison to his later thinking on the subject, it offers another model of the highly prescriptive nature of most Roman rhetorical treatises.

Cicero's major work on rhetoric was *De Oratore* (55 B.C.), in which he attempted to restore the union of rhetoric and philosophy by advocating that rhetoric be taught as the single art useful for dealing with all practical affairs. He drew heavily on Isocrates' ideas in advocating an integration of natural ability, comprehensive knowledge of all the liberal arts, and extensive practice in writing. As a practicing orator, Cicero developed the notion of style more fully than did his predecessors and devoted virtually an entire treatise, *Orator* (46 B.C.), to distinguishing three types of style—the plain, the moderate, and the grand.[12]

A final Roman rhetorician deserving of mention is the Roman lawyer and educator, M. Fabius Quintilian (35–95 A.D.). In his *Institutes of Oratory* (93 A.D.), Quintilian described the ideal training of the citizen-orator from birth through retirement. He defined the orator as "the good man speaking well," and his approach was not rule bound as were many Roman rhetorics.[13] He was eclectic and flexible, drawing from Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, and Cicero and also integrating his own teaching experiences into traditional theory. His work was so systematic that it not only serves as an excellent synthesis of Greek and Roman rhetorical thought, but it was an important source of ideas on education throughout the Middle Ages.

With the decline of democracy in Rome, rhetoric entered an era when it essentially was divorced from civic affairs. A series of emperors were in power, and anyone who spoke publicly in opposition to them was likely to be punished. Rhetoric, then, was relegated to a back seat and became an art concerned with style and delivery rather than with content. This period, from about 150 to 400 A.D., often is referred to as the Second Sophistic because of the excesses of delivery and style similar to those for which the early sophists were criticized.

The Middle Ages (400–1400 A.D.) followed the Second Sophistic, and during this period, rhetoric became aligned with preaching, letter writing, and education. The

[11] George Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 106–08.

[12] For a summary of Cicero's style, see Thomas R. King, "The Perfect Orator in *Brutus*," *Southern Speech Journal*, 33 (Winter 1967), 124–28.

[13] Thonssen and Baird, p. 92.

concern with preaching as an oratorical form might be said to have begun with St. Augustine (354–430 A.D.). Many call Augustine a bridge between the classical and medieval periods; nevertheless, he is the only major thinker on rhetoric associated with the Middle Ages. As Christianity became increasingly powerful, rhetoric was condemned as a pagan art; many Christians believed that the rhetorical ideas formulated by the pagans of classical Greece and Rome should not be studied and that possession of Christian truth was accompanied by an automatic ability to communicate that truth effectively. St. Augustine, however, had been a teacher of rhetoric before converting to Christianity in 386. Thus, in his *On Christian Doctrine* (426), he argued that preachers need to be able to teach, to delight, and to move—Cicero's notion of the duties of the orator—and that to accomplish the aims of Christianity, attention to the rules of effective expression was necessary.[14] Because St. Augustine believed such rules were to be used only in the expression of truth, he revitalized the philosophic basis of rhetoric that largely had been ignored since Quintilian.

Letter writing was another form in which rhetoric found expression during the Middle Ages. Many political decisions were made privately through letters and decrees; in addition, letter writing became a method of record keeping for both secular and religious organizations as they increased in size and complexity. Letter writing, too, was necessary in order to bridge the distances of the medieval world, which no longer consisted of a single center of culture and power as was the case with the classical period.[15] Thus, principles of letter writing, including the conscious adaptation of salutation, language, and format to a particular addressee, were studied as rhetoric.

Finally, rhetoric played a role in education in the Middle Ages as one of the three great liberal arts. Along with logic and grammar, rhetoric was considered part of the *trivium* of learning, much as our three Rs of reading, writing, and arithmetic function today.[16] While the emphasis shifted among these arts from time to time, each was treated in a highly practical rather than a theoretic manner.

The Renaissance, from 1400 to 1600 A.D., signaled the end of the Middle Ages but did little to alter substantially the course of rhetorical thought. Few innovations were introduced; instead, the classical writers were emphasized and many of the Greek and Latin treatises that had been presumed lost were discovered in monasteries. The concern with style and expression that characterized the Middle Ages continued with perhaps even more excess, prompting it to be labeled an age of "social ingratiation."[17]

Peter Ramus (1515–1572) was a well-known French scholar of the Renaissance who typified the position accorded to rhetoric during this period. Essentially, he made rhetoric subordinate to logic by placing invention and organization under the rubric of logic and leaving rhetoric with only style and delivery.[18] This dichotomizing and

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[14] James J. Murphy, "Saint Augustine and the Debate About a Christian Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 56 (December 1960), 400–10; and Saint Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* xvii, 34.

[15] Nancy L. Harper, *Human Communication Theory: The History of a Paradigm* (Rochelle Park, N.J.: Hayden, 1979), p. 71; and James Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

[16] Donald Lemen Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1957), p. 12.

[17] Douglas Ehninger, "On Rhetoric and Rhetorics," *Western Speech*, 31 (Fall 1967), 244.

[18] Wilbur Samuel Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1956), p. 148.

departmentalizing of knowledge made for easy teaching, and Ramus' taxonomy was perpetuated for generations through the educational system.

The period from 1600 to 1900 is known as the age of modern rhetoric. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) is a figure who bridges the rhetoric of the Renaissance and that of modern rhetoric. He was concerned with the lack of scholarly progress during the Middle Ages and sought to promote a revival of secular knowledge through an empirical examination of the world. He introduced ideas about the nature of sensory perception, arguing that our sensory interpretations are highly inaccurate and should be subjected to reasoned, empirical investigation. His definition of rhetoric contained this notion of rationality: "the duty of Rhetoric is to apply Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the will."[19] Bacon, then, anticipated the decline in the church's influence, the renewed interest in rhetoric, and the focus on psychological and cognitive processes that would become important to the study of rhetoric in the next centuries.

Three trends in rhetoric characterized the modern period—epistemological, belletristic, and elocutionist. Epistemology is the study of the origin, nature, methods, and limits of human knowledge. Epistemological thinkers sought to recast classical approaches in terms of modern developments in psychology. They attempted to understand rhetoric in relation to underlying mental processes and contributed to the development of a rhetoric firmly grounded in a study of human nature.

George Campbell (1719–1796) and Richard Whately (1758–1859) exemplify the best of the epistemological tradition. Campbell was a Scottish minister, teacher, and author of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1776). He drew on Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian as well as the faculty psychology and empiricism of his times. Faculty psychology attempted to explain human behavior in terms of five powers or faculties of the mind—understanding, memory, imagination, passion, and will—and Campbell's definition of rhetoric was directed to these faculties: "to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will."[20] Campbell's approach to evidence suggests his ties to the rational, empirical approach to knowledge gaining prominence in his day. He distinguished three types of evidence—mathematical axioms, derived through reasoning; consciousness, or the result of sensory stimulation; and common sense, an intuitive sense share by virtually all humans.

Richard Whately, like Campbell, was a preacher, and his *Elements of Rhetoric*, published in 1828, often is considered the logical culmination of Campbell's thought.[21] His view of rhetoric was similar to Campbell's in its dependence on faculty psychology, but he deviated in making argumentation the focus of the art of rhetoric: "The *finding* of suitable arguments to prove a given point, and the skilful [sic] *arrangement* of them, may be considered as the immediate and proper province of Rhetoric, and of that alone."[22] He also is remembered for his analysis of presumption

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[19] Hugh C. Dick, ed., *Selected Writings of Francis Bacon* (New York: Modern Library, 1955), p. x; and Harper, pp. 100, 109.

[20] George Campbell, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer (1776; rpt. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963), p. 1.

[21] Douglas Ehninger, "Introduction," in Richard Whately, *Elements of Rhetoric*, ed. Douglas Ehninger (1828; rpt. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 1963), p. xv.

[22] Whately, p. 39.

and burden of proof, which paved the way for modern argumentation and debate practices. The epistemologists, then, combined their knowledge of classical rhetoric and contemporary psychology to create rhetorics based on an understanding of human nature. In this, they offered audience-centered approaches to rhetoric and paved the way for contemporary concerns with audience analysis.

The second direction rhetoric took in the modern period is known as the belles lettres movement; the term, in French, literally means "fine or beautiful letters." It referred to literature valued primarily for its aesthetic qualities more than for its informative value. Belletristic rhetorics were distinguished by their breadth—rhetoric was considered to consist not only of spoken discourse but of writing and criticism as well. In addition, the scholars of this school believed that all the fine arts, including rhetoric, poetry, drama, music, and even gardening and architecture, could be subjected to the same critical standards.[23] Thus, the critical component to rhetoric gained an importance not seen in earlier approaches.

Hugh Blair (1718–1800) stands as a representative figure of the belletristic period. In his *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, based on a series of lectures he delivered at the University of Edinburgh, he presented an overview of the relationship among rhetoric, literature, and criticism. One of his most innovative contributions was his discussion of taste, or the faculty that is capable of deriving pleasure from contact with the beautiful. Taste, according to Blair, is perfected when a sensory pleasure is coupled with reason—when reason can explain the source of that pleasure.[24] Blair's ideas on rhetoric proved extremely popular and laid the foundations for contemporary literary and rhetorical criticism.

The elocutionary movement, the third rhetorical trend of the modern period, reached its height in the mid-eighteenth century. It developed in response to the poor delivery styles of contemporary preachers, lawyers, and other public figures and because the canon of delivery had been neglected, for the most part, since classical times. Like the epistemologists, the elocutionists were concerned about contributing to a more scientific understanding of the human being and believed that their observations on voice and gesture—characteristics unique to humans—constituted one such contribution.[25] The elocutionists also sought to determine the effects of delivery on the various faculties of the mind, thus continuing the link with modern psychology. Despite a stated concern for invention, however, many elocutionary treatises were not much more than prescriptive and often highly mechanical techniques for the management of voice and gestures.

Gilbert Austin's guidelines are representative of the highly stylized approach of the elocutionists. He offered this advice to the speaker, for instance, about eye contact and volume: "He should not stare about, but cast down his eyes, and compose his countenance: nor should he at once discharge the whole volume of his voice,

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[23] James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, and William E. Coleman, *The Rhetoric of Western Thought*, 3rd ed. (1976; rpt. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1983), pp. 107–108.

[24] Hugh Blair, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (London: William Baynes and Son, 1825), p. 24.

[25] Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, pp. 175–76.

but begin almost at the lowest pitch, and issue the smallest quantity; if he desire to silence every murmur, and to arrest all attention."[26] As another example, James Burgh believed each emotion could be linked with a specific, external expression; he categorized seventy-one emotions and their particular manifestations. Thomas Sheridan (1719–1788), who wrote *A Course of Lectures on Elocution* in 1762, was perhaps the most famous elocutionist. Sheridan not only was in the forefront in terms of criticizing the speakers of his day, but he sought to establish a universal standard of pronunciation for the English language in addition to offering the usual techniques for delivery.[27]

The elocutionists have been criticized for their excesses in terms of style and delivery and for the inflexibility of their techniques. Their efforts to derive an empirical science of delivery based on observation, however, foreshadowed the use of the scientific method to study all aspects of human communication, and their theories had a tremendous effect on how speech was taught in American classrooms in the nineteenth century.

The twentieth century has seen a renewed interest in the study of rhetoric, and this era has become known as the contemporary period. While the elocutionists had narrowed the focus of rhetoric to delivery, contemporary rhetorical scholars have revitalized rhetoric as an art that includes the canons of invention, organization, and elocution, as well as delivery. Contemporary scholars also tend to be eclectic, drawing not only on the rhetorical treatises of classical Greece and Rome and other periods but on a variety of contemporary disciplines such as psychology, sociology, literary criticism, English, and philosophy as well. Currently, then, rhetoric has regained some of its earlier importance as a broad liberal art that is more than simply the expression of ideas or considerations of style apart from substance or action.

DEVELOPING YOUR UNDERSTANDING

1. Explain what impact the following sophistic maxim has on the definition, scope, and function of rhetoric: "Man is the measure of all things."
2. Based on the abbreviated rhetorical history presented by Foss et al, identify several different definitions of rhetoric. Analyze and discuss their similarities and differences. Then, present your own definition of rhetoric and explain your rationale.
3. Referring to the rhetoricians discussed in Foss et al, summarize the different ways rhetoric, philosophy, politics, and ethics have been related (or separated) in definitions of rhetoric.
4. Develop your own definition of rhetoric (if you have not done so already for question 2). In your definition of rhetoric, describe the relationships between rhetoric, philosophy, politics, and ethics. Then, assess how your position is supported and/or challenged by the history of rhetoric as presented by Foss et al.

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[26] Gilbert Austin, *Chironomia or a Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery*, ed. Mary Margaret Robb and Lester Thonssen (1806; rpt. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1966), p. 94.

[27] Thomas Sheridan, *A Course of Lectures on Elocution* (London: W. Strahan, 1762).

FOCUSING ON KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Focus on the following terms and concepts while you read through this selection. Understanding these will not only increase your understanding of the selection that follows, but you will find that, because most of these terms or concepts are commonly used in professional writing and rhetoric, understanding them helps you get a better sense of the field itself.

1. dialectic
2. art
3. artistic pisteis
4. nonartistic pisteis
5. invent
6. ethos
7. pathos
8. logos
9. topos/topoi
10. deliberative rhetoric
11. judicial rhetoric
12. demonstrative rhetoric

Excerpts from Book I, Rhetoric

ARISTOTLE translated by GEORGE A. KENNEDY

Books 1–2 discuss the means of persuasion available to a public speaker from logical argument, the presentation of the speaker's character, and moving the emotions of the audience. Although this part of rhetoric has come to be known as "invention," Aristotle himself offers no general term for it until the transition section at the end of book 2, where he refers to it as *dianoia*, "thought." Throughout books 1 and 2, understanding the available means of persuasion is treated as constituting the whole of rhetoric, properly understood; and until the last sentence of 2.26 there is no anticipation of discussion of style and arrangement in book 3. Books 1–2 are a unit and probably made up the whole of the *Rhetoric* as it once existed.

CHAPTERS 1–3: INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: Introduction to Rhetoric for Students of Dialectic

The *Rhetoric* shows signs of being addressed to different audiences, probably reflecting differing contexts in which Aristotle lectured on rhetoric at different times in his career. Though much of the work provides practical instruction on how to compose a speech, useful to any citizen, some parts seem to be addressed primarily to students of philosophy. What is now regarded as the first chapter of book 1 was apparently originally addressed to students who had completed a study of dialectic (such as is found

in the *Topics*) and who had little knowledge of rhetoric, though they may have been aware of the existence of handbooks on the subject. For them Aristotle explains the similarities between dialectic as they know it and rhetoric as he understands it but does not comment on the differences. The chapter as a whole is very Platonic and contains echoes of several of Plato's dialogues.

Dialectic, as understood by Aristotle, was the art of philosophical disputation. Practice in it was regularly provided in his philosophical school, and his treatise known as *Topics* is a textbook of dialectic. The opening chapters of the *Topics* may be found in Appendix I.C. The procedure in dialectic was for one student to state a thesis (e.g., "Pleasure is the only good") and for a second student to try to refute the thesis by asking a series of questions that could be answered by *yes* or *no*. If successful, the interlocutor led the respondent into a contradiction or logically undefensible position by means of definition and division of the question or by drawing analogies; however, the respondent might be able to defend his position and win the argument. Dialectic proceeds by question and answer, not, as rhetoric does, by continuous exposition. A dialectical argument does not contain the parts of a public address; there is no introduction, narration, or epilogue, as in a speech—only proof. In dialectic only logical argument is acceptable, whereas in rhetoric (as Aristotle will explain in chapter 2), the impression of character conveyed by the speaker and the emotions awakened in the audience contribute to persuasion. While both dialectic and rhetoric build their arguments on commonly held opinions (*endoxa*) and deal only with the probable (not with scientific certainty), dialectic examines general issues (such as the nature of justice) whereas rhetoric usually seeks a specific judgment (e.g., whether or not some specific action was just or whether or not some specific policy will be beneficial). Epideictic is a partial exception to this. Platonic dialogues make extensive use of dialectic as Socrates seeks to refute the position of an opponent—for example, Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles in the *Gorgias*. Platonic dialogues also contain rhetorical passages expressive of Socrates' character and appeals to the emotions of the hearer, as in his second speech in the *Phaedrus*.

After discussing the similarities between dialectic and rhetoric, Aristotle criticizes (sections 3–11) the *arts*, or handbooks, of previous writers, which he finds unsatisfactory in several ways. These handbooks are now lost; and the only surviving treatise on rhetoric from the classical period other than Aristotle's is a slightly later work known as the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. Into this discussion are inserted parenthetical remarks (sections 7–9) on the specificity desirable in framing good laws, a subject of interest to students of political philosophy but of limited relevance to rhetorical theory. The chapter concludes (sections 12–14) with a discussion of why rhetoric is useful—remarks that can be thought of as addressed primarily to students of philosophy who, under the influence of Plato, may regard the subject of rhetoric as trivial. A general Greek audience would probably have assumed that rhetoric was useful and been more dubious about dialectic, which could easily seem pedantic hairsplitting, as it did to Isocrates (see, e.g., *Against the Sophists* and the prooemion to the *Encomium of Helen*).

Chapter 1 creates acute problems for the unity of the treatise. Aristotle here seems firmly to reject using the emotions, identifies rhetoric with logical argument, and gives no hint that style and arrangement may be important in rhetoric (as will emerge in book 3). In section 6 he even seems to say that the importance of the justice of a case are not appropriate issues for a speaker to discuss; they should be left for

the audience to judge. But the justice of a speaker's case, its importance, and its amplification subsequently will be given extended treatment. Some interpreters seek to force the point of view of chapter 1 into conformity with what follows by making very careful distinctions about what Aristotle is saying. This involves claiming, for example, that *pisteis*, "proofs," in section 3 already includes the use of character and emotion as means of persuasion, that *verbal attack*, *pity*, and *anger* in section 4 refer to *expressions* of emotion rather than to the reasoned use of an understanding of psychology and motivation. Section 6 can be made consistent with later parts of the work if Aristotle is regarded as saying that the speaker's interpretation of what is just or important should not be allowed to color the audience's judgment. It can be stressed that a speaker needs to understand tricks that may be used by an opponent but should not employ them himself. Despite other possible interpretations, it is probably better to acknowledge frankly that chapter 1 is inconsistent with what follows, that it is far more austere in tone than Aristotle's general view of rhetoric, and that the difference results from addressing different audiences and from the attempt to link the study of dialectic with that of rhetoric. Aristotle either failed to revise the chapter or has let stand a deliberately provocative critique of the teaching of rhetoric in his own time as a way of emphasizing the needs for greater attention to logic, thus justifying the writing of a rhetoric handbook by a philosopher. The chapter might even be compared to Socrates' provocative description in the *Gorgias* of contemporary rhetoric as a form of flattery, a view that Socrates, too, subsequently modifies. The result is to encourage a dialogue between the reader and the text of the *Rhetoric* about the moral purpose and valid uses of rhetoric.

The first chapter is one of the earliest examples of an introduction to the study of a discipline (the beginning of the *Topics* is another) and is thus an antecedent of the Greek *prolegomenon* or Latin *accessus* commonly found at the beginning of technical works in later antiquity and the Middle Ages.

[1354a] 1. Rhetoric[1] is an *antistrophos*[2] to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined science.[3] A result is that all people, in some way, share in both; for all, to some extent, try both to test and maintain an argument [as in dialec-

[1] *Hē rhētorikē* (the rhetorical), a feminine singular adjective used as an abstract noun; cf. *dialektikē*, *poiētikē*. Neither dialectic nor rhetoric assume knowledge of any technical subject, and both build a case on the basis of what any reasonable person would believe. Aristotle takes the term *rhetoric* from Plato; others usually spoke of the "art of speech"; see Schiappa 1990.

[2] *Antistrophos* is commonly translated "counterpart." Other possibilities include "correlative" and "coordinate." The word can mean "converse." In Greek choral lyric, the metrical pattern of a *strophē*, or stanza, is repeated with different words in the *antistrophē*. Aristotle is, however, probably thinking of, and rejecting, the analogy of the true and false arts elaborated by Socrates in the *Gorgias*, where justice is said to be an *antistrophos* to medicine (464b8) and rhetoric, the false form of justice, is compared to cookery, the false form of medicine (465c1–3). Isocrates (*Antidosis* 182) speaks of the arts of the south (called philosophy, but essentially political rhetoric) and the arts of the body (gymnastic) as *antistrophoi*. This view is equally unacceptable to Aristotle, for whom rhetoric is a tool, like dialectic, though its subject matter is derived from some other discipline, such as ethics or politics; see *Rhetoric* 1.2.7. Aristotle thus avoids the fallacy of Plato's *Gorgias* where Socrates is obsessed with finding some kind of knowledge specific to rhetoric. On later interpretations of *antistrophos* se Green 1990.

[3] The first sentence of the treatise, with its proposition and supporting reason, is an example of what Aristotle will call an enthymeme. The reader should become sensitive to the constant use of enthymemes throughout the text, often introduced by the particular *gar* (for).

tic] and to defend themselves and attack [others, as in rhetoric]. 2. Now among the general public, some do these things randomly and others through an ability acquired by habit,[4] but since both ways are possible, it is clear that it would also be possible to do the same by [following] a path; for it is possible to observe[5] the cause why some succeed by habit and others accidentally,[6] and all would at once agree that such observation is the activity of an art [*tekhnē*].[7]

3. As things are now,[8] those who have composed *Arts of Speech* have worked on a small part of the subject; for only *pisteis*[9] are artistic (other things are supplementary), and these writers say nothing about enthymemes, which is the "body" of persuasion,[10] while they give most of their attention to matters external to the subject; 4. for verbal attack and pity and anger and such emotions of the soul do not relate to fact but are appeals to the juryman.[11] As a result, if all trials were conducted as they are in some present-day states and especially in those well governed, [the handbook writers] would have nothing to say; 5. for everyone thinks the laws ought to require this, and some even adopt the practice and forbid speaking outside the subject, as in the Areopagus too,[12] rightly so providing; for it is wrong to warp the jury by leading them into anger or envy or pity: that is the same as if someone made a straightedge rule crooked before using it. 6. And further, it is clear that the opponents have no function except to show that something is or is not true or has happened or has not happened;[13] whether it is important or trivial or just or unjust, in so far as the lawmaker has not provided a definition, the juryman should somehow decide himself and not learn from the opponents.[14]

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[4] The former hardly know what they are doing; but the latter, by trial and error, have gained a practical sense of what is effective.

[5] *Theorein*, lit. "see" but with the implication "theorize." This is an instance of the visual imagery common in the *Rhetoric*.

[6] Here, as often, Aristotle reverses the order of reference: *accidentally* refers back to *randomly*. Such *chiasmus* is a common feature of Greek.

[7] In contrast to Socrates in the *Gorgias*, Aristotle has no doubt that rhetoric is an art. Awareness of the cause of success allows technique to be conceptualized and taught systematically. On Aristotle's understanding of an "art," see the passage from *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4 in Appendix I.B.

[8] In 1.2.4 Aristotle again criticizes contemporary technical writers. He thus appears to be thinking primarily of the handbooks of the mid–fourth century, such as those by Pamphilus and Callippus cited in 2.23.21. Aristotle collected the doctrines of some handbooks in a lost work, *Synagōgē tekhnōn*; see Appendix I.D. Plato provides a brief summary of the earlier ones in *Phaedrus* 266d–67d.

[9] *Pistis* (pl. *pisteis*) has a number of different meanings in different contexts: "proof, means of persuasion, belief," etc. In 1.2.2–3 Aristotle distinguishes between artistic and nonartistic *pisteis*, and divides the former into three means of persuasion based on character, logical argument, and arousing emotion. Here in chap. 1 readers familiar with dialectic have no knowledge yet of persuasion by character or emotion and will assume that *pistis* means "logical proof." In 3.17.15 *pistis* means "logical argument" in contrast to character presentation.

[10] *Body* is here contrasted with "matters external" in the next clause. Though Aristotle does not say so, one might speculate that the soul, or life, of persuasion comes from ethical and emotional qualities.

[11] The handbooks offered examples of argument from probability, but they did not recognize its logical structure. The concept of the logical syllogism and its rhetorical counterpart, the enthymeme (to be discussed in chap. 2), are Aristotelian contributions. The handbooks probably treated the emotions in discussing the prooemium and epilogue (on which see Aristotle's account in 3.13,19) and in separate collections or discussions such as the *Eleoi* of Thrasymachus (see *Rhetoric* 3.1.7).

[12] In Aristotle's time the jurisdiction of the Athenian court of the Areopagus was chiefly limited to homicide cases. That its rules of relevance were strict is also attested in Lycurgus' speech *Against Leocrites* 12.

[13] On the possible implications of this statement for Aristotle's view of a "general rhetoric," see Wieland 1968; but there is no other passage in Aristotle expressly supporting the view Wieland advances.

[14] On the problems created by this statement, see the introductory comment to this chapter.

The following passage on framing laws resembles some of what Plato says in *Laws* 9.875–76[15] and is apparently a parenthetical remark of Aristotle to students of political philosophy; he may well have said something of this sort to young Alexander. Section 9 will take up where section 6 leaves off.

(7. It is highly appropriate for well-enacted laws to define everything as exactly as possible and for as little as possible to be left to the judges:[16] first because it is easier to find one or a few than [to find] many who are prudent and capable of framing laws and judging; **[1354b]** second, legislation results from consideration over much time, while judgments are made at the moment [of a trial or debate], so it is difficult for the judges to determine justice and benefits fairly; but most important of all, because the judgment of a lawmaker is not about a particular case but about what lies in the future and in general, while the assemblyman and the juryman are actually judging present and specific cases. For them, friendliness and hostility and individual self-interest are often involved, with the result that they are no longer able to see the truth adequately, but their private pleasure or grief casts a shadow on their judgment. 8. In other matters, then, as we have been saying, the judge should have authority to determine as little as possible; but it is necessary to leave to the judges the question of whether something has happened or has not happened, will or will not be, is or is not the case; for the lawmaker cannot foresee these things.)

9. If this is so, it is clear that matters external to the subject are described as an art by those who define other things; for example, what the introduction [*prooimion*] or the narration [*diēgēsis*][17] should contain, and each of the other parts; for [in treating these matters] they concern themselves only with how they may put the judge in a certain frame of mind,[18] while they explain nothing about artistic proofs; and that is the question of how one may become *enthymematic*.[19] 10. It is for this reason that although the method of deliberative and judicial speaking is the same and though deliberative subjects are finer and more important to the state than private transactions, [the handbook writers] have nothing to say about the former, and all try to describe the art of speaking in a lawcourt, because it is less serviceable to speak things outside the subject in deliberative situations;[20] for there the judge judges about matters that affect himself, so that nothing is needed except to show that circumstances are as the speaker says.[21] But in judicial speeches this is not enough; rather, it is serviceable to

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[15] A suggestion made to the translator by Eckhardt Schütrumpf.

[16] This "philosophical" position is somewhat modified in 1.13.13, when Aristotle considers the practical problems involved.

[17] The *Arts*, or handbooks of rhetoric, were organized around discussion of what should be said in each of the separate parts usually found in a judicial speech. These included *prooimion* (introduction), *diēgēsis* (narration), *pistis* (proof), and *epilogos* (conclusion) and sometimes additional parts. See 3.13–19.

[18] This was regarded as a major function of the prooemium (cf. 3.14.9–11) and epilogue (3.19.1).

[19] The meaning of this term will be explained in the next paragraph.

[20] The *Arts* of rhetoric to which Aristotle refers were certainly largely concerned with techniques useful in the law courts; but speeches like Demosthenes' *On the Crown* show that these could be as fine and as politically significant as speeches in the democratic assembly and were by no means limited to "private transactions," or contracts, as Aristotle insinuates. In the manuscripts the sentence continues, "and deliberative oratory is less mischievous than judicial, but of more general interest." This is probably an addition by a later writer.

[21] In deliberative rhetoric the "judges" are members of a council or assembly making decisions about public matters that affect themselves.

gain over the hearer; for the judgment is about other people's business and the judges, considering the matter in relation to their own affairs and listening with partiality, lend themselves to [the needs of] the litigants but do not judge [objectively]. **[1355a]** Thus, as we said earlier, in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject [in court cases]; in deliberative assemblies the judges themselves adequately guard against this.

11. Since it is evident that artistic method is concerned with *pisteis* and since *pistis* is a sort of demonstration [*apodeixis*][22] (for we most believe when we suppose something to have been demonstrated) and since rhetorical *apodeixis* is enthymeme (and this is, generally speaking, the strongest of the *pisteis*) and the enthymeme is a sort of syllogism [or reasoning] (and it is a function of dialectic, either as a whole or one of its parts, to see about every syllogism equally), it is clear that he who is best able to see from what materials, and how, a syllogism arises would also be most enthymematic—if he grasps also what sort of things an enthymeme is concerned with and what differences it has from a logical syllogism; for it belongs to the same capacity both to see the true and [to see] what resembles the true, and at the same time humans have a natural disposition for the true and to a large extent hit on the truth; thus an ability to aim at commonly held opinions [*endoxa*] is a characteristic of one who also has a similar ability to regard to the truth.[23]

The Usefulness of Rhetoric

That other writers describe as an art things outside the subject [of a speech] and that they have rather too much inclined toward judicial oratory is clear; 12. but rhetoric is useful [first] because the true and the just are by nature[24] stronger than their opposites, so that if judgments are not made in the right way [the true and the just] are

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[22] *Apodeixis* = "demonstration," usu. with logical validity (as in scientific reasoning) but occasionally more generally, including probable argument (as here).

[23] On *endoxa* see *Topics* 1.1 in Appendix I.C. The student is assumed already to understand, from earlier study of logic and dialectic, the concepts of *pistis*, *apodeixis*, and *enthymema*. Enthymeme literally means "something in the mind" and had been used by Alcidamas and Isocrates to mean "idea" expressed in a speech. In *Prior Analytics* 2.27 an enthymeme is defined as "a syllogism from probabilities or signs." Aristotle sometimes uses *syllogismos* loosely to mean "reasoning," *enthymema* to mean a consideration in whatever form it is put. A valid syllogism in the technical sense is a logical certainty, "true," and most perfectly seen only when expressed symbolically, e.g., "If all A is B, and some A is C, then all C is B." The traditional example in post-Aristotelian logic is, "If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is a mortal." In 1.2.14 Aristotle says that "few" of the premises of enthymemes are necessarily true, thus slightly modifying the definition in the *Analytics*. In 1.2.13 and 2.22.3 he says that an enthymeme need not express all its premises. The Aristotelian distinction between syllogism and an enthymeme thus seems largely one of context—tightly reasoned philosophical discourse in the case of syllogism versus popular speech or writing with resulting informality in the expression of the argument in an enthymeme. In public address an argument may be a worthwhile consideration even if it is not absolutely valid. An example of a typical enthymeme might be "Socrates is virtuous; for he is wise" or "Since/If Socrates is wise, he is virtuous." Here the premises are only probable and a universal major premise, "All the wise are virtuous" is assumed. For Aristotle's own examples of enthymemes, see 2.21.2 and the end of 3.17.17.

[24] Aristotle believed that truth was grounded in nature (*physis*) and capable of apprehension by reason. In this he differs both from Plato (for whom truth is grounded in the divine origin of the soul) and from the sophists (for whom judgments were based on *nomos* [convention], which in turn results from the ambivalent nature of language as the basis of human society).

necessarily defeated [by their opposites]. And this is worthy of censure.[25] Further, even if we were to have the most exact knowledge, it would not be very easy for us in speaking to use it to persuade some audiences. Speech based on knowledge is teaching, but teaching is impossible [with some audiences]; rather, it is necessary for *pisteis* and speeches [as a whole] to be formed on the basis of common [beliefs], as we said in the *Topics*[26] about communication with a crowd. Further, one should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, just as in the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do both (for one should not persuade what is debased)[27] but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly. None of the other arts reasons in opposite directions; dialectic and rhetoric alone do this, for both are equally concerned with opposites.[28] Of course the underlying facts are not equally good in each case; but true and better ones are by nature always more productive of good syllogisms and, in a word, more persuasive. In addition, it would be strange if an inability to defend oneself by means of the body is shameful, while there is no shame in an inability to use speech; **[1355a]** the latter is more characteristic of humans than is use of the body. 13. And if it is argued that great harm can be done by unjustly using such power of words, this objection applies to all good things except for virtue, and most of all to the most useful things, like strength, health, wealth, and military strategy; for by using these justly one would do the greatest good and unjustly, the greatest harm.[29]

14. That rhetoric, therefore, does not belong to a single defined genus of subject but is like dialectic and that it is useful is clear—and that its function is not to persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case, as is true also in all the other arts; for neither is it the function of medicine to create health but to promote this as much as possible; for it is nevertheless possible to treat well those who cannot recover health. In addition, [it is clear] that it is a function of one and the same art to see the persuasive and [to see] the apparently persuasive, just as [it is] in dialectic [to recognize] a syllogism and [to recognize] an apparent syllogism;[30] for sophistry is not a matter of ability but of deliberate choice [*proairesis*] [of specious arguments].[31] In the case of rhetoric, however, there is the difference that one person

[25] On the text and interpretation of this sentence, see Grimaldi, 1980–88, 1:25–28. Judgments will not be made in the right way if the facts and reasons are not brought out persuasively. To do this, the speaker needs a knowledge of rhetoric.

[26] *Topics* 1.1.2; see Appendix I.C.

[27] *What is debased (ta phaula)* refers to whatever is bad, cheap, or morally and socially useless. This principle, important as a response to the criticisms of Plato, appears only in a parenthetical remark and is not repeated in the prescriptive parts of the treatise.

[28] There is, however, the difference that in dialectic, opposite trains of argument are actually expressed in the dialectical situation, whereas in rhetoric the speaker has usually tried to think out the opposing arguments before speaking to be able to answer them if need arises. But occasionally, an orator will both express and refute an opposing argument in the course of a speech or even be seen debating with himself about what is right.

[29] Another possible echo of instruction to Alexander.

[30] Rhetoric uses both logically valid arguments and probabilities. The jump to sophistry in the next sentence perhaps implies a recognition that "the apparently persuasive" and "an apparent syllogism" include fallacious arguments that initially sound valid in an oral situation but will not hold up under scrutiny. Both the orator and the dialectician need to be able to recognize these.

[31] In modern linguistic terminology, *sophist* is the "marked" member of the pair *dialectician/sophist* in that the

will be [called] *rhētōr*[32] on the basis of his knowledge and another on the basis of his deliberate choice, while in dialectic *sophist* refers to deliberate choice [of specious arguments], *dialectician* not to deliberate choice, but to ability [at argument generally]. Let us now try to discuss the method itself: how and from what sources we may reach our objectives.[33] Starting again, therefore, as it were from the beginning, after defining what rhetoric is, let us say all that remains [to be said about the whole subject].

Chapter 2: Definition of Rhetoric; *Pisteis,* or the Means of Persuasion in Public Address; Paradigms, Enthymemes, and Their Sources; Common Topics; *Eidē* and *Idia*

1. Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.[34] This is the function of no other art;[35] for each of the others[36] is instructive and persuasive about its own subject: for example, medicine about health and disease and geometry about the properties of magnitudes and arithmetic about numbers and similarly in the case of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric seems to be able to observe the persuasive about "the given," so to speak. That, too,

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first includes the second; but *rhētōr* is "unmarked" and may be interpreted either as any effective speaker or as a speaker who uses tricky arguments.

[32] In classical Greek, *rhētōr* means any public speaker, though often referring to a person who plays a leadership role in public debate or is active in the law courts. In the Roman period, *rhētōr* frequently means "rhetorician, "teacher of rhetoric." Latin *orator* (orig. "envoy") and thus English "orator," are translations of *rhētōr* but take on an implication of eloquence not necessarily present in the Greek word.

[33] For some speculations on Aristotle's objectives, see Lord 1981. Aristotle's own objective is clearly an understanding of the nature, materials, and uses of rhetoric; but he has pointed out that the art is useful, and as the treatise unrolls it will often take on the tone of a prescriptive handbook on how to compose a persuasive speech.

[34] Aristotle uses the phrase *estō dē,* "Let X be. . ." commonly of a working hypothesis rather than a final definition and occasionally to resume a definition made earlier. The definition here is anticipated in 1.1.14 on the *ergon* of rhetoric. He identifies the genus to which rhetoric belongs as *dynamis:* "ability, capacity, faculty." In his philosophical writing *dynamis* is the regular word for "potentially" in matter or form that is "actualized" by an efficient cause. The actuality produced by the potentiality of rhetoric is not the written or oral text of a speech, or even persuasion but the art of "seeing" how persuasion may be effected. In *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4 (see Appendix I.B) he defines all art as a reasoned capacity to make something and says that it is concerned with the coming-into-being of something that is capable of either being or not being. Art is thus for him not the product of artistic skill, but the skill itself. Later rhetoricians often amplify Aristotle's definition by adding *through speech;* the root of the word *rhetoric, rhē–,* refers specifically to speech. Though he uses *poetics* to refer to arts other than poetry (dance, painting, sculpture), he never uses *rhetoric* to refer to any art except that of speech. As is clear from chap. 3, Aristotle primarily thinks of rhetoric as manifested in the civic context of public address; but he often draws examples of rhetoric from poetry or historical writing, and in the *Poetics* (19.1456a–b) the "thought" of a speaker in tragedy is said to be a matter of rhetoric. *In each case (peri hekaston)* refers to the fact that rhetoric deals with specific circumstances (particular individuals and their actions). *To see* translates *theorēsai,* "to be an observer of and to grasp the meaning or utility of." English *theory* comes from the related noun *theoria. The available means of persuasion* renders *to enkekhomenon pithanon,* "what is inherently and potentially persuasive" in the facts, circumstances, character of the speaker, attitude of the audience, etc. *Endekhomenon* often means "possible."

[35] Dialectic comes closest but deals with general questions, not specific cases; and for dialectic the final term, *means of persuasion (pithanon),* would presumably become *means of reasoning (syllogismos);* see *Topics* 1.1 in Appendix I.C.

[36] Except, of course, dialectic.

is why we say it does not include technical knowledge of any particular, defined genus [of subjects].

2. Of the *pisteis*, some are atechnic ["nonartistic"], some entechnic ["embodied in art, artistic"].[37] I call atechnic those that are not provided by "us" [i.e., the potential speaker] but are preexisting: for example, witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under torture,[38] contracts, and such like; and artistic whatever can be prepared by method and by "us"; thus, one must *use* the former and *invent*[39] the latter. **[1356a]** 3. Of the *pisteis* provided through speech there are three species: for some are in the character [*ēthos*] of the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some way, and some in the argument [*logos*] itself, by showing or seeming to show something.[40]

4. [There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken[41] in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt.[42] And this should result from speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person;[43] for it is not the case, as some of the technical writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness [*epieikeia*] on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness;[44] rather, character is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion.

5. [There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion [*pathos*] by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile. To this and only this we said contempo-

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[37] Later writers sometimes call these *extrinsic* and *intrinsic*, respectively. Aristotle discusses atechnic proof in 1.15. In 3.16.1 he also refers to the "facts" in a epideictic speech as atechnic.

[38] In Greek law, the evidence of slaves was only admissible in court if taken under torture. There was much debate about its reliability; see 1.15.26.

[39] *Heurein*, "to find out"; *heuresis* becomes the regular word for rhetorical invention.

[40] *Ēthos* in Aristotle means "character," esp. "moral character," and except in 2.21.16 is regarded as an attribute of a person, not of a speech. Aristotle does not use the term in the technical sense of "rhetorical ethos," the technique or effect of the presentation of character in a discourse. "Disposing the listener in some way" is defined in sec. 5 below as leading the hearers to feel emotion (*pathos*). Again, *pathos* is an attribute of persons, not of a speech. The shorthand ethos–pathos–logos to describe the modes of persuasion is a convenience but does not represent Aristotle's own usage.

[41] Aristotle is not thinking of style and delivery but of the thought and contents.

[42] Here and in 1.9.1 and 2.1.5–7 the role of character in a speech is regarded as making the speaker seem trustworthy. The extended discussion of types of character in 2.12–17 relates to the somewhat different matter of the adaptation of the character of a speaker to the character of an audience. Aristotle's later treatment of character in rhetoric is in fact somewhat wider than in this initial definition.

[43] Aristotle thus does not include in rhetorical ethos the authority that a speaker may possess due to his position in government or society, previous actions, reputation for wisdom, or anything except what is actually contained in the speech and the character it reveals. Presumably, he would regard all other factors, sometimes highly important in the success of rhetoric, as inartistic; but he never says so. One practical reason for stressing character as revealed within the speech was that Greek law required defendants to speak on their own behalf, and they were often lacking in external authority. They could commission a speech from a professional speechwriter (logographer) and then memorize it for delivery in court. Lysias, in particular, had great success in conveying a favorable impression or moral character (*ēthopoiia*) in the many speeches he wrote for defendants.

[44] Some handbook writers perhaps rejected an appearance of fair-mindedness as too mild and favored an uncompromising attitude. Aristotle's point is that an appearance of fair-mindedness gives the speaker an initial advantage.

rary technical writers try to give their attention. The details on this subject will be made clear when we speak about the emotions.[45]

6. Persuasion occurs through the arguments [*logoi*] when we show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.

7. Since *pisteis* come about through these [three means], it is clear that to grasp an understanding of them is the function of one who can form syllogisms and be observant about characters and virtues and, third, about emotions (what each of the emotions is and what are its qualities and from what it comes to be and how). The result is that rhetoric is a certain kind of offshoot [*paraphues*] or dialectic and of ethical studies (which it is just to call politics).[46] (Thus, too, rhetoric dresses itself up[47] in the form of politics, as do those who pretend to a knowledge of it,[48] sometimes through lack of education, sometimes through boastfulness and other human causes.) Rhetoric is partly [*morion ti*] dialectic, and resembles it, as we said at the outset; for neither of them is identifiable with knowledge of any specific subject, but they are distinct abilities of supplying words. Concerning their potentiality and how they relate to each other, almost enough has been said.

8. In the case of persuasion through proving or seeming to prove something, just as in dialectic **[1356b]** there is on the one hand induction [*epagēgē*] and on the other the syllogism and the apparent syllogism, so the situation is similar in rhetoric; for the *paradeigma* ["example"] is an induction, the *enthymema* a syllogism. I call a rhetorical syllogism an enthymeme, a rhetorical induction a paradigm.[49] And all [speakers] produce logical persuasion by means of paradigms or enthymemes and by nothing other than these. As a result, since it is always necessary to show something either by syllogizing or by inducing (and this is clear to us from the *Analytics*),[50] it is necessary that each of these be the same as each of the others.[51] 9. What the difference is between a

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[45] In 2.2–11. Aristotle's inclusion of emotion as a mode of persuasion, despite his objections to the handbooks, is a recognition that among human beings judgment is not entirely a rational act. There are morally valid emotions in every situation, and it is part of the orator's duty to clarify these in the minds of the audience. On this question in general, see Johnstone 1980; 1–24.

[46] In calling rhetoric an *antistrophos* of dialectic in 1.1.1, and an offshoot of dialectic and ethical studies here, and "partly dialectic" and like it in the next sentence, Aristotle avoids use of the formal categories of genus and species. He cannot very well call rhetoric a species of dialectic, since it contains elements—the persuasive effect of character and emotion in particular—that are not proper to dialectic; but at the same time he stresses the logical side of rhetoric and thus its relationship to dialectic. He does not entertain the possibility that dialectic should be regarded as a species of rhetoric, perhaps because dialectic deals with universals, rhetoric with specifics; dialectic is logically prior. Also, to make rhetoric the more general term would lead to the celebration of it as the most characteristic and worthwhile human activity, as Isocrates regarded it. For Aristotle, that honor belongs to philosophy—hence his attempt to find metaphors to describe rhetoric as a mixture of logical, political, and ethical elements. In *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.2.4–6 he says that politics is an "architectonic" subject, of which generalship, economics, and rhetoric are parts.

[47] *Hypoduetai,* an echo of Plato, *Gorgias* 464c.

[48] Gorgias, Polus, Isacrates, and their followers.

[49] Aristotle will discuss the paradigm at greater length in 2.20 and the enthymeme in 2.22. The first three sentences of this paragraph, found in all manuscripts, are double-bracketed by Rudolf Kassel in his Berlin 1976 edition of the Greek text, which is Kassel's way of indicating passages that he regarded as later additions by Aristotle to the otherwise completed treatise. These are interesting suggestions, but essentially subjective in each case.

[50] *Prior Analytics* 2.23; *Posterior Analytics* 1.1.

[51] Not identical, in which case there would be no need for two sets of terms, but *essentially* the same in their

paradigm and an enthymeme is clear from the *Topics* (for an account was given there earlier of syllogism and induction):[52] to show on the basis of many similar instances that something is so is in dialectic induction, in rhetoric paradigm; but to show that if some premises are true, something else [the conclusion] beyond them results from these because they are true, either universally or for the most part, in dialectic is called syllogism and in rhetoric enthymeme. 10. And it is also apparent that either species of rhetoric[53] has merit (what has also been said in the *Methodics*[54] is true in these cases too); for some rhetorical utterances are paradigmatic, some enthymematic; and similarly, some orators are paradigmatic, some enthymematic. Speeches using paradigms are not less persuasive, but those with enthymemes excite more favorable audience reaction. 11. The cause—and how each should be used—we shall explain later;[55] now we shall explain these things themselves more clearly.

Since the persuasive is persuasive to someone (and is either immediately plausible and believable in itself or seems to be shown by statements that are so) and since no art examines the particular—for example, the art of medicine does not specify what is healthful for Socrates or for Callias but for persons of a certain sort (this is artistic, while particulars are limitless and not knowable)—neither does rhetoric theorize about each opinion—what may seem so to Socrates or Hippias—but about what seems true to people of a certain sort, as is also true with dialectic.[56] For the latter does not form syllogisms from things at random (some things seem true even to madmen) but from that [which seems true] to people in need of argument, and rhetoric [forms enthymemes] from things [that seem true] to people already accustomed to deliberate among themselves.[57] **[1357a]** 12. Its function [*ergon*] is concerned with the sort of things we debate and for which we do not have [other] arts and among such listeners as are not able to see many things all together or to reason from a distant starting point. And we debate about things that seem to be capable for admitting two possibilities; for no one debates things incapable of being different either in past or future or present, at least not if they suppose that to be the case; for there is nothing more [to say]. 13. It is possible to form syllogisms and draw inductive conclusions either from previous syllogisms or from statements that are not reasoned out but require a syllogism [if they are to be accepted] because they are not commonly believed [*endoxa*]; but the former of these [i.e., a chain of syllogism] is necessarily not easy to follow because of the length [of the argument] (the judge is assumed to be a simple

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underlying structure. In formal logic an induction consists of a series of particular observations from which a general conclusion is drawn; in rhetoric it takes the form of a particular statement supported by one or more parallels, with the universal conclusion left unstated. Similarly, an enthymeme rarely takes the full syllogistic form of major premise, minor premise, and conclusion; more often a conclusion is offered and supported by a reason, as in the first sentence of the *Rhetoric*. On the logic of this passage see Schröder 1985. Schröder does not agree with Kassel's view that it is a later addition.

[52] There is some discussion of syllogism in *Topics* 1.1, and 1.12 offers a definition of induction with an example: "If the skilled pilot is best, and [similarly] the charioteer, then in general the skilled is the best in each thing."

[53] The species using example or that using enthymeme.

[54] A lost logical work by Aristotle of which the extant *On Interpretation* may have been a part; see Rist 1989, 84.

[55] In 2.20–24.

[56] Dialectic builds its proof on the opinions of all, the majority, or the wise; cf. *Topics* 1.1 in Appendix I.C.

[57] Translating the text as conjectured by Kassel.

person),[58] and the latter is not persuasive because the premises are not agreed to or commonly believed. Thus, it is necessary for an enthymeme and a paradigm to be concerned with things that are for the most part capable of being other than they are—the paradigm inductively, the enthymeme syllogistically—and drawn from few premises and often less than those of the primary syllogism;[59] for if one of these is known, it does not have to be stated, since the hearer supplies it: for example, [to show] that Dorieus has won a contest with a crown it is enough to have said that he has won the Olympic games, and there is no need to add that the Olympic games have a crown as the prize; for everybody knows that.[60]

14. Since few of the premises from which rhetorical syllogisms are formed are necessarily true (most of the matters with which judgment and examination are concerned can be other than they are; for people deliberate and examine what they are doing, and [human] actions are all of this kind, and none of them [are], so to speak, necessary) and since things that happen for the most part and are possible can only be reasoned on the basis of other such things, and necessary actions [only] from necessities (and this is clear to us also from the *Analytics*),[61] it is evident that [the premises] from which enthymemes are spoken are sometimes necessarily true but mostly true [only] for the most part. Moreover, enthymemes are derived from probabilities [*eikota*] and signs [*sēmeia*], so it is necessary that each of these be the same as each [of the truth values mentioned];[62] 15. for a probability [*eikos*] is what happens for the most part, not in a simple sense, as some define it, but whatever, among things that can be other than they are, is so related to that in regard to which it is probable as a universal is related to a particular.[63] **[1357b]** 16. In the case of signs [*sēmeia*], some are related as the particular to the universal, some as the universal to the particular. Of these, a necessary sign is a *tēkmerion*, and that which is not necessary has no distinguishing name. 17. Now I call necessary for those from which a [logically valid] syllogism can be formed; thus, I call this kind of sign a *tēkmerion;* for when people think it is not possible to refute a statement, they think they are offering a *tekmērion,* as though the matter were shown and concluded [*peparasmenon*]. (*Tekmar* and *peras*

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[58] By *judge (kritēs)* Aristotle means a member of the assembly or of a jury. In Athenian legal procedures there were no professional judges in the modern sense. The democratic juries of the Athenian courts ranged in size from 201 to 5,001, drawn by lot from the male citizen body.

[59] The fully expressed syllogism that is logically inherent in the enthymeme.

[60] Later writers (see Appendix I.F) often regard an enthymeme as an abbreviated syllogism in which one premise, usually the major, is not expressed but is assumed, e.g., "Socrates is mortal, for he is a man," assuming "all men are mortal." Aristotle notes that this is often the case, but it is not a necessary feature of the enthymeme. The real determinant of an enthymeme in contrast to a syllogism is what a popular audience will understand. Aristotle regards rhetoric, and thus the enthymeme, as addressed to an audience that cannot be assumed to follow intricate logical argument or will be impatient with premises that seem unnecessary steps in the argument. The underlying logical structure should, however be present.

[61] *Prior Analytics* 1.8, 1.12–14, 1.27; *Posterior Analytics* 1.6, 1.30, 2.12.

[62] I.e., probabilities correspond to things true for the most part, signs to things necessarily true. But Aristotle will modify this in what follows: some signs are necessary, others only probable. Both probabilities and signs are statements about human actions, though they may be based on physical manifestations, as the following examples show.

[63] Grimaldi (1980–88, 1:62) instances "Children love their parents": it is a "probability" because a general observation—universal in form, probably, but not necessarily true in particular instances. "Some" may refer to handbook writers who discussed argument from probability.

["limit, conclusion"] have the same meaning in the ancient form of [our] language.) 18. An example of signs [*sēmeia*] related as the particular to the universal is if someone were to state that since Socrates was wise and just, it is a sign that the wise are just. This is indeed a sign, but refutable, even if true in this case; for it is not syllogistically valid. But if someone were to state that there is a sign that someone is sick, for he has a fever, or that a woman has given birth, for she has milk, that is a necessary sign. Among signs, this is only true of a *tekmērion;* for only it, if true, is irrefutable. It is an example of the relation of the universal to the particular if someone said that it is a sign of fever that someone breathes rapidly. This, too, is refutable, even if true [in some case]; for it is possible to breathe rapidly and not be feverish. Thus, what probability is and what sign and *tekmērion* are and how they differ has now been explained. In the *Analytics*[64] they are defined more clearly, and the cause explained why some are not syllogistic and others are.

19. It has been explained that a paradigm is an induction and with what kinds of things it is concerned. It is reasoning neither from part to whole nor from whole to part but from part to part, like to like, when two things fall under the same genus but one is better known than the other.[65] For example, [when someone claims] that Dionysius is plotting tyranny because he is seeking a bodyguard; for Peisistratus also, when plotting earlier, sought a guard and after receiving it made himself tyrant, and Theagenes [did the same] in Megara, and others, whom the audience knows of, all become examples of Dionysius, of whom they do not yet know whether he makes his demand for this reason. All these actions fall under the same [genus]: that one plotting tyranny seeks a guard.[66]

[1358a] The sources of *pisteis* that seem demonstrative [*apodeiktikai*] have now been explained. 20. But in the case of enthymemes, a very big difference—and one overlooked by almost everybody—is one that is also found in the case of syllogisms in dialectical method; for some [enthymemes] are formed in accord with the method of rhetoric, just as also some syllogisms are formed in accord with the method of dialectic, while others accord with [the content of] other arts and capabilities, either those in existence or those not yet understood.[67] Hence, [the differences] escape notice of the listeners; and the more [speakers] fasten upon [the subject matter] in its proper sense, [the more] they depart from rhetoric or dialectic.[68] This statement will be clearer if explained in more detail.

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[64] *Prior Analystics* 2.27.

[65] There is an "unmeditated inference," or unspoken recognition of the universal proposition. See Hauser 1985, 171–79.

[66] It could be argued that seeking a bodyguard is a "sign" of intent to establish a tyranny, and certainly paradigms and signs have some similarity; but Aristotle seems to think of a paradigm as useful in indicating motivation or the probable course of events that the audience might not otherwise anticipate, whereas a sign is usually an existing fact or condition that anyone might recognize. More important to him, however, is the logical difference that the paradigm moves from the particular premises to a particular conclusion, with the universal link not necessarily expressed (just as the universal major premise of an enthymeme need not be expressed), whereas the sign moves either from universal to particular or particular to universal.

[67] It is characteristic of Aristotle to feel that there were other subjects not yet systematically studied.

[68] This passage is regarded as textually corrupt by the editors. Kassel indicates that something has been lost after *listeners;* Ross rejects *the more*. The basic thought is that people do not realize that rhetoric and dialectic, though they have a method, lack content or facts and must borrow these from other disciplines, such as politics or ethics. Enthymemes are rhetorical strategies but also usually substantive arguments; and the more the argu-

The "Topics" of Syllogisms and Enthymemes

Topos literally means "place," metaphorically that location or space in an art where a speaker can look for "available means of persuasion." Rhetoric itself can be said to operate in civic space. Although the word accords with Aristotle's fondness for visual imagery, he did not originate its use in the sense of "topic"; Isocrates, early in the fourth century, had so used it, and probably others did before him. In Isocrates' *Encomium of Helen* (section 4) *topos* refers to forms of eristical argument, such as fact or possibility—what Aristotle will call *koina*. In the same speech (section 38) *topos* refers to the use of an ancient witness, Theseus' opinion of Helen—what Aristotle regards as "nonartistic" *pistis*. The word may also already have been used in mnemonic theory of the physical setting against which an object or idea could be remembered. Neither in *Topics* nor in *Rhetoric* does Aristotle give a definition of *topos*, another sign that he assumed the word would be easily understood; he does, however, give his own special twist to its meaning, usually distinguishing it from *koina* and *idia* and using it primarily of strategies of argument as discussed in 2.23. See Sprute 1982, 172–82.

21. I am saying that dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are those in which we state *topoi*, and these are applicable in common [*koinēi*] to questions of justice and physics and politics and many different species [of knowledge]; for example, the *topos* of the more and the less;[69] for to form syllogisms or speak enthymemes from this about justice will be just as possible as about physics or anything else, although these subjects differ in species.[70] But there are "specifics"[71] that come from the premises of each species and genus [of knowledge]; for example, in physics there are premises from which there is neither an enthymeme nor a syllogism applicable to ethics; and in ethics [there are] others not useful in physics. It is the same in all cases. The former [the common *topoi*] will not make one understand any genus; for they are not concerned with any underlying subject. As to the latter [the specifics], to the degree that someone makes better choice of the premises, he will have created knowledge different from dialectic and rhetoric without its being recognized; for if he succeeds in hitting on first principles [*arkhai*], the knowledge will no longer be dialectic or rhetoric but the science of which [the speaker] grasps the first principles.[72] 22. Most en-

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ment comes from the premises of politics, ethics, or other subjects, the more the enthymeme becomes an argument of that discipline and the less it is purely rhetorical. In practice, the limits are never reached; any argument has some strategy (what Aristotle will call "topics" in 2.23) and some content (what he will call *idia* and discuss in 1.4–14 and 2.1–17). Some possible implications of this passage are discussed by Garver 1988, but he twists the meaning of some of Aristotle's words (*metabainō*, *tynkhanō*, etc.) to create problems that perhaps do not exist.

[69] To be discussed in 2.23.4 (the chapter on topics).

[70] The *topos* does not tell one anything about these subjects but can be applied to each; for example, "If it is just to punish offenses, it is more just to punish great offenses," "If a small force will move a body, a larger force will move it as well" and "If public revenues will support a large army, they will support a smaller army."

[71] *Idia* (n. pl. of the adj. from *eidos*), "specificities, specific or particular things." The word is chosen to denote things characteristic of the species. Aristotle here does not call these specifics topics, but he does so refer to them in 1.15.19; and in sec. 22, as well as in 1.61, he speaks of them as *stoikheia*, which he says later (2.22.13, 2.26.1) are the "same" as topics. Thus, many rhetoricians have found it convenient to speak of "special, specific, particular, material" topics belonging to the separate disciplines, in contrast to "common" or "formal" topics, which are rhetorical or dialectical strategies of argument.

[72] For the concept of "first principles" see note on 1.7.12. Part or all of a discourse may be thought of as falling in a spectrum, varying from the most general and popular to the most technical. A speech in a law court, for example, will become less "rhetorical" and more "jurisprudential" as it undertakes detailed discussion of the

thymemes are derived from these species that are particular and specific, fewer from the common [topics].[73] Just as in the case of *topoi*, so also in the case of enthymemes, a distinction should be made between the species and the *topoi* from which they are to be taken. By "species" I mean the premises specific to each genus [of knowledge], and by *topoi* those common to all. But let us take up first the genera [*gene*] of rhetoric so that having defined how many there are, we may separately take up their elements[74] and premises.[75]

Chapter 3: The Three Species of Rhetoric: Deliberative, Judicial, and Epideictic

1. The species [*eidē*] of rhetoric are three in number; for such is the number [of classes] to which the hearers of speeches belong. A speech [situation] consists of three things: a speaker and a subject on which he speaks and someone addressed,[76] **[1358b]** and the objective [*telos*] of the speech relates to the last (I mean the hearer). 2. Now it is necessary for the hearer to be either a spectator [*theoros*] or a judge [*kritēs*], and [in the latter case] a judge of either past or future happenings. A member of a democratic assembly is an example of one judging about future happenings, a juryman an example of one judging the past. A spectator is concerned with the ability [of the speaker].[77] 3. Thus, there would necessarily be three genera of rhetorics;[78] *symbouleutikon* ["deliberative"], *dikanikon* ["judicial"], *epideiktikon* ["demonstrative"]. Deliberative advice is ei-

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law. In terms of valid proof it is desirable to do this, but too technical a speech will not be comprehensible to the judges.

[73] This is because of the need for "content": rhetoric constantly employs the special knowledge of other arts, such as politics or ethics.

[74] Elements (*stoikheia*) are the same as topics; see 2.22.13, 2.26.1.

[75] Aristotle's use of *genos*, *eidos*, and *idia* in this passage may make it somewhat difficult to follow; but he is probably not seeking to make a logical statement about the relationship of genus and species. In a general way he can be said to view knowledge as a genus of which particular forms, (e.g., physics, politics, and ethics) are species (*eidē*). The premises of the *eidē* are their *idia*. In the concluding sentence he also calls the kinds of rhetoric *genē* (genera), but in the first sentence of the next chapter will call them *eidē* (species) and in 3.3 reverts to *genē*. See n. 78.

[76] Eighteenth-century rhetoricians add *the occasion* to Aristotle's three factors in the speech situation, and modern authorities have suggested other approaches, e.g., "addresser, message, addressee, context, common code, and contact" (Roman Jakobson).

[77] This sentence is rejected by Kassel as an insertion into the text by a later reader, perhaps rightly. The audience in epideictic is not called upon to take a specific action, in the way that an assemblyman or juryman is called upon to vote; but epideictic may be viewed as an oratorical contest, either with other speakers or previous speakers (cf., e.g., Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 1), and in 2.18.1 Aristotle notes that the spectator also is in this sense a judge. The definition of epideictic has remained a problem in rhetorical theory, since it becomes the category for all forms of discourse that are not specifically deliberative or judicial; later ancient rhetoricians regarded it as including poetry and prose literature, and since Renaissance times it has sometimes included other arts like painting, sculpture, and music as well. Aristotle, however, thinks of epideictic only as a species of oratory as he knew its forms in Greece, including funeral orations like that by Pericles in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (2.35–46) and the *Encomia* of Helen by Gorgias and Isocrates. In such speeches, praise corrects, modifies, or strengthens an audience's belief about civic virtue or the reputation of an individual.

[78] The appearance here of "rhetorics" in the plural is very unusual in Greek and probably results from the use of *genē* in the plural. Aristotle may use *genē* here of the kinds of rhetorics earlier called *eidē* because in the next sentence he is going to divide them further into species.

ther protreptic ["exhortation"] or apotreptic ["dissuasion"]; for both those advising in private and those speaking in public always do one or the other of these. In the law court there is either accusation [*katēgoria*] or defense [*apologia*]; for it is necessary for the disputants to offer one or the other of these. In epideictic, there is either praise [*epainos*] or blame [*psogos*]. 4. Each of these has its own "time": for the deliberative speaker, the future (for whether exhorting or dissuading he advises about future events); for the speaker in court, the past (for he always prosecutes or defends concerning what has been done); in epideictic the present is the most important; for all speakers praise or blame in regard to existing qualities, but they often also make use of other things, both reminding [the audience] of the past and projecting the course of the future.[79] 5. The "end"[80] of each of these is different, and there are three ends for three [species]: for the deliberative speaker [the end] is the advantageous [*sympheron*][81] and the harmful (for someone urging something advises it as the better course and one dissuading dissuades on the ground that it is worse), and he includes other factors as incidental: whether it is just or unjust, or honorable or disgraceful; for those speaking in the law courts [the end] is the just [*dikaion*] and the unjust, and they make other considerations incidental to these; for those praising and blaming [the end] is the honorable [*kalon*] and the shameful, and these speakers bring up other considerations in reference to these qualities. 6. Here is a sign that the end of each [species of rhetoric] is what has been said: sometimes one would not dispute other factors; for example, a judicial speaker [might not deny] that he has done something or done harm, but he would never agree that he has [intentionally] done wrong; for [if he admitted that,] there would be no need of a trial. Similarly, deliberative speakers often grant other factors, but they would never admit that they are advising things that are not advantageous [to the audience] or that they are dissuading [the audience] from what is beneficial; and often they do not insist that it is not unjust to enslave neighbors or those who have done no wrong. And similarly, those who praise or blame do not consider whether someone has done actions that are advantageous or harmful [to himself] **[1359a]** but often they include it even as a source of praise that he did what was honorable without regard to the cost to himself; for example, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his companion Patroclus knowing that he himself must die, though he could have lived. To him, such a death was more honorable; but life was advantageous.

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[79] In practice, as in funeral orations, speakers usually praise past actions but with the intent of celebrating timeless virtues and inculcating them as models for the future.

[80] *Telos*, the final objective of the speaker and his art, which is actualized in the persuasion of an audience. Later rhetoricians sometimes called these "final headings." Each *telos* often becomes a specific topic in a speech; see, for example, the discussions of expedience and justice in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus in the Mytilenian debate in Thucydides 3.37–48.

[81] *Sympheron* is often translated "expedient"; literally, it means whatever "brings with it" advantage (Lat. *utilitas*). Later rhetoricians were troubled by the moral implication and sought to modify what they saw as Aristotle's focus on expediency in political discourse; see esp. Quintilian 3.8.1–3. Since Aristotle has said in 1.1.12 that we must not persuade what is bad, he would presumably recommend that a speaker seek to identify the enlightened, long-term advantage to the audience. "Advantageous" or "beneficial" seems the best translation. In sec. 6 Aristotle recognizes that in practice deliberative speakers are often indifferent to the question of the injustice to others of some action.

Propositions Common to All Species of Rhetoric

No technical term appears in this chapter to denote the four subjects of propositions described here, but in 2.18.2 they are called *koina*, "common things," "commonalties," in contrast to *idia*, "specifics." They are discussed in greater detail in 2.19. Since the *koinon* "greater and smaller" discussed in section 9 seems similar to the topic of "the more and the less" mentioned in 1.2.21, these *koina* have often been called "topics" or "common topics." Grimaldi (1980–88, 1:85–86) objects to this, with some reason, though in 3.19.2 Aristotle speaks of "topics" of amplification and seems to be referring to 2.19. Generally, however, Aristotle keeps them distinct: the topic of "the more and the less," discussed separately in 2.23.4, is a strategy of argument, always involving some contrast, whereas "greater and smaller," discussed in 1.7, 14 and 2.19.26–27, are arguments about the degree of *magnitude* (that term occurs in 2.18.4) or importance of something and are analogous to such questions as whether something is possible or has actually been done. Whether something is possible, actually true, or important are fundamental issues in any speech; and thus Aristotle mentions them immediately after identifying the basic issues of the advantageous, the just, and the honorable.

7. It is evident from what has been said that it is first of all necessary [for a speaker] to have propositions [*protaseis*] on these matters.[82] (*Tekmēria* and probabilities and signs are rhetorical propositions. A syllogism is wholly from propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism consisting of propositions expressed.)[83] 8. And since impossibilities cannot be done nor have been done, but possibilities [alone can be done or have been done], it is necessary for the deliberative, judicial, and epideictic speaker to have propositions about the possible and the impossible and [about] whether something has happened or not and [about] whether it will or will not come to be. 9. Further, since all speakers, praising and blaming and urging and dissuading and prosecuting and defending, not only try to show what has been mentioned but that the good or the evil or the honorable or the shameful or the just or the unjust is great or small, either speaking of things in themselves or in comparison to each other, it is clear that it would be necessary also to have propositions about the great and the small and the greater and the lesser, both generally and specifically; for example, [about] what is the greater or lesser good or injustice or justice, and similarly about other qualities.[84] The subjects about which it is necessary to frame propositions have [now] been stated. Next we must distinguish between each in specific terms; that is, what deliberation, and what epideictic speeches, and thirdly, what lawsuits, are concerned with.

DEVELOPING YOUR UNDERSTANDING

1. Aristotle argues that the function of rhetoric is not to persuade but to discover the available means of persuasion. Explain how "persuasion" and "discovering the means of persuasion" are distinct. Then, explain how the distinction affects the scope and purpose of the rhetor's/professional writer's work?

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[82] The advantageous, the just, the honorable, and their opposites.

[83] The propositions inherent in the underlying syllogism are not necessarily all expressed in the related enthymeme; some may be assumed.

[84] The subjects of propositions common to all species of rhetoric are thus the possible and impossible, past fact (or its nonexistence), future fact (or its nonexistence), and degree of magnitude or importance. These are discussed further in 2.19.

2. According to Aristotle's characterization, rhetoric is a generalizable art that, when applied to particular situations, helps guide speaking/writing. Briefly explain this characterization of rhetoric. Then, discuss what professional writers gain from an art of rhetoric, as well as the limitations such an art poses for professional writers.
3. Aristotle argues that "rhetoric is a certain kind of offshoot [*paraphues*] of dialectic and of ethical studies (which it is just to call politics)." Referring to this passage, found in Chapter 2, section 7, as well as others, summarize the relationship that Aristotle builds between rhetoric and other arts, sciences, and practices.
4. Identify and explain the functions of rhetoric as argued by Aristotle. Refer to specific passages.

FOCUSING ON KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Focus on the following terms and concepts while you read through this selection. Understanding these will not only increase your understanding of the selection that follows, but you will find that, because most of these terms or concepts are commonly used in professional writing and rhetoric, understanding them helps you get a better sense of the field itself.

1. science
2. induction
3. syllogism
4. art
5. the variable
6. the invariable
7. practical wisdom
8. deliberation
9. virtue

Excerpts from "Book VI, Intellectual Virtue" in Nicomachean Ethics: *The Chief Intellectual Virtues*

ARISTOTLE translated by DAVID ROSS

SCIENCE—DEMONSTRATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NECESSARY AND ETERNAL

3. Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states once more. Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason; we do not include judgment and opinion because in these we may be mistaken.

Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose that what we know is not even

Source: From *The Nicomachean Ethics* by Aristotle, translated by David Ross (World's Classics, 1980), pp. 140–143. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable. Again, every science is thought to be capable of being taught, and its object of being learned. And all teaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in the Analytics also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction and sometimes by syllogism. Now induction is the starting-point which knowledge even of the universal presupposes, while syllogism proceeds from universals. There are therefore starting-points from which syllogism proceeds, which are not reached by syllogism; it is therefore by induction that they are acquired. Scientific knowledge is, then, a state of capacity to demonstrate, and has the other limiting characteristics which we specify in the Analytics, for it is when a man believes in a certain way and the starting-points are known to him that he has scientific knowledge, since if they are not better known to him than the conclusion, he will have his knowledge only incidentally.

Let this, then, be taken as our account of scientific knowledge.

ART—KNOWLEDGE OF HOW TO MAKE THINGS

4. In the variable are included both things made and things done; making and acting are different (for their nature we treat even the discussions outside our school as reliable); so that the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence too they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is making acting. Now since architecture is an art and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to make, and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any such state that is not an art, art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. All art is concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made; for art is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, by necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance with nature (since these have their origin in themselves). Making and acting being different, art must be a matter of making, not of acting. And in a sense chance and art are concerned with the same objects; as Agathon says, "art loves chance and chance loves art." Art, then, as has been is a state concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning, and lack of art on the contrary is a state concerned with making, involving a false course of reasoning; both are concerned with the variable.

PRACTICAL WISDOM—KNOWLEDGE OF HOW TO SECURE THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE

5. Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of things conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general. This

is shown by the fact that we credit men with practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those that are not the object of any art. It follows that in the general sense also the man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom. Now no one deliberates about things that are invariable, nor about things that it is impossible for him to do. Therefore, since scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for all such things might actually be otherwise), and since it is impossible to deliberate about things that are of necessity, practical wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge nor art; not science because that which can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action and making are different kinds of things. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end. It is for this reason that we think Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general; we consider that those can do this who are good at managing households or states. (This is why we call temperance (sophrosune) by this name; we imply that it preserves one's practical wisdom (sozousa tan phronsin). Now what it preserves is a judgment of the kind we have described. For it is not any and every judgment that pleasant and painful objects destroy and pervert, e.g. the judgment that the triangle has or has not its angles equal to two right angles, but only judgments about what is to be done. For the originating causes of the things that are done consist in the end at which they are aimed; but the man who has been ruined by pleasure or pain forthwith fails to see any such originating cause—to see that for the sake of this or because of this he ought to choose and do whatever he chooses and does; for vice is destructive of the originating cause of action.)

Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods. But further, while there is such a thing as excellence in art, there is no such thing as excellence in practical wisdom; and in art he who errs willingly is preferable, but in practical wisdom, as in the virtues, he is the reverse. Plainly, then, practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art. There being two parts of the soul that can follow a course of reasoning, it must be the virtue of one of the two, i.e. of that part which forms opinions; for opinion is about the variable and so is practical wisdom. But yet it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by the fact that a state of that sort may forgotten but practical wisdom cannot.

DEVELOPING YOUR UNDERSTANDING

1. Prepare a table or matrix that captures the distinctions between science, art, and practical wisdom as outlined by Aristotle, and be prepared to discuss your table/matrix in class.
2. Characterize what rhetoric would be if it were categorized as a science, an art, and a practice/action. Then, compare and contrast the three depictions, drawing out the key similarities and differences.
3. Aristotle used the variable and invariable as one set of features to distinguish the virtues. Referring to other readings in this chapter, and perhaps sources outside this book with which you are familiar, argue whether you consider rhetoric to be concerned with the variable or the invariable, and explain the impact you see such a distinction making on what rhetoric is and is not.

FOCUSING ON KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Focus on the following terms and concepts while you read through this selection. Understanding these will not only increase your understanding of the selection that follows, but you will find that, because most of these terms or concepts are commonly used in professional writing and rhetoric, understanding them helps you get a better sense of the field itself.

1. epideictic
2. deliberative
3. judicial
4. invention
5. arrangement
6. style
7. memory
8. delivery
9. six parts of discourse

Excerpts from Book I, Rhetorica Ad Herennium

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO translated by HARRY CAPLAN

BOOK I

1 I. My private affairs keep me so busy that I can hardly find enough leisure to devote to study, and the little that is vouchsafed to me I have usually preferred to spend on philosophy. Yet your desire, Gaius Herennius, has spurred me to compose a work on the Theory of Public Speaking, lest you should suppose that in a matter which concerns you I either lacked the will or shirked the labour. And I have undertaken this project the more gladly because I knew that you had good grounds in wishing to learn rhetoric, for it is true that copiousness and facility in expression bear abundant fruit, if controlled by proper knowledge and a strict discipline of the mind.

That is why I have omitted to treat those topics which, for the sake of futile self-assertion, Greek writers[a] have adopted. For they, from fear of appearing to know too little, have gone in quest of notions irrelevant to the art, in order that the art might seem more difficult to understand. I, on the other hand, have treated those topics which seemed pertinent to the theory of public speaking. I have not been moved by hope of gain[b] or desire for glory, as the rest have been, in undertaking to write, but

Source: Reprinted by permission of the publishers and Trustees of the Loeb Classical Library from *Cicero: Volume I ~ Rhetorica and Herenium,* Loeb Classical Library Volume L 403, translated by Harry Caplan, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1954, pp. 3–11. The Loeb Classical Library ® is a registered trademark of the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

[a] The beginning of Book 4 further sets forth the author's attitude to the Greek writers on rhetoric (who these are specifically is uncertain); *cf.* also 3. xxiii. 38. For his attitude to philosophical studies see the end of Book 4.
[b] Apparently textbooks on public speaking sold well; see Theodor Birt, *Rhein. Mus.* 72 (1917/18). 311–16.

have done so in order that, by my painstaking work, I may gratify your wish. To avoid prolixity, I shall now begin my discussion of the subject, as soon as I have given you this one injunction: Theory without continuous practice in speaking is of little avail; from this you may understand that the precepts of theory here offered ought to be applied in practice.

2 II. The task of the public speaker is to discuss capably those matters which law and custom have fixed for the uses of citizenship, and to secure as far as possible the agreement of his hearers.[c] There are three kinds[d] of causes which the speaker must treat: Epideictic, Deliberative, and Judicial.[e] The epideictic kind is devoted to the praise or censure of some particular person. The deliberative consists in the discussion of policy and embraces persuasion and dissuasion.[f] The judicial is based on legal controversy, and comprises criminal prosecution or civil suit, and defence.[g]

Now I shall explain what faculties the speaker should possess, and then show the proper means of treating these causes.[h]

3 The speaker, then, should possess the faculties of Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery.[i] Invention is the devising of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing.[j] Arrangement is the ordering and distribution of the matter, making clear the place to which each thing is to be assigned. Style is the adaptation of suitable words and sentences to the matter devised. Memory is the

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[c] The definition is that of Hermagoras, to whom the function (εργον) of the perfect orator is τὸ τεθὲν πολιτικὸν ζητῆμα διατιθεσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πειοτικῶς . See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Rhet.* 62, ed. Fabricius, 2. 150. *Cf.* Cecero, *De Inv.* 1. v. 6.

[d] γένη.

[e] ἐπιδεικτικόν, ουμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν. The scheme is Aristotelian (*rhet.* 1. 3, 1358b) but in essence older. The author's emphasis in the first two books, on the judicial kind, is characteristically Hellenistic (*e.g.*, Hermagorean). The better tradition indicates that originally rhetoric was concerned with the judicial kind, and was later extended to the other two fields. For a study of the *three genera* see D. A. G. Hinks, *Class. Quarterly* 30 (1936). 170–6. *Cf.* Cicero, *De Inv.* 1. v. 7.

[f] προτροπή ανδ ἀποτροπή.

[g] κατηγορία, δικη, απολογία.

[h] 2. ii. 2 below.

[i] εύρεσις, τάξις or οἰκονομία, λέξις or ἑρμηνεία or φράσις, μνήμη, ὑπσκρισις. The pre-Aristotelian rhetoric, represented by the *Rhet. Ad Alexandrum*, treated the first three (without classifying them); Aristotle would add Delivery (*Rhet.* 3. 1, 1403b), and his pupil Theophrastus did so (see note on 3. xi. 19 below). When precisely in the Hellenistic period Memory was added as a fifth division by the Rhodian or the Pergamene school, we do not know. These faculties (*res*; see also 1. ii. 3) are referred to in 2. i. 1 below (*cf.* 1.iii.4) as the speaker's *functions* (*officia* = εργα του ῥήτορος). Quintilian, 3. 3. 11ff., considers them as departments or constituent elements of the art (*paries rhetorices*) rather than as *opera* (= *officia*); so also here at 3. i. 1, 3. viii. 15, 3. xvi. 28, and Cicero, *De Invi.* 1. vii. 9. εργον is an Aristotelian concept (*cf.* the definition of rhetoric in *Rhet.* 1. 1–2, 1355b), and Aristotle was the first to classify the (major) functions. Our author here gives the usual order of the divisions; so also Cicero, *De Oratore* 1. 31. 142. Diogenes Laertius, 7. 43, presents the Stoic scheme: Invention, Style (φράσις), Arrangement, and Delivery. A goodly number of rhetorical systems were actually based on these εργα (*e.g.*, in most part Cicero's and Quintilian's); others were based on the divisions of the discourse (μόρια λόγου). See K. Barwick, *hermes* 57 (1922). 1 ff.; Friedrich Solmsen, *Amer. Journ. Phiolo.* 62 (1941). 35–50, 169–90. Our author conflates the two schemes he has inherited; see especially 1. ii. 3–iii. 4, 2. i. 1–ii. 2, and the Introduction to the present volume, p. xviii.

[j] The concept goes back at least as far as Plato (*e.g.*, *Phaedrus* 236 A); see Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1. 2 (1355b), on finding artistic proofs.

firm retention in the mind of the matter, words, and arrangement. Delivery is the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture.

All these faculties we can acquire by three means: Theory, Imitation, and Practice.[k] By theory is meant a set of rules that provide a definite method and system of speaking. Imitation stimulates us to attain, in accordance with a studied method, the effectiveness of certain models in speaking. Practice is assiduous exercise and experience in speaking.

Since, then, I have shown what causes the speaker should treat and what kinds of competence he should possess, it seems that I now need to indicate how the speech can be adapted to the theory of the speaker's function.

4 III. Invention is used for the six parts of a discourse: the Introduction, Statement of Facts, Division, Proof, Refutation, and Conclusion.[l] The Introduction is the beginning of the discourse, and by it the hearer's mind is prepared[m] for attention. The Narration or Statement of Facts sets forth the events that have occurred or might have occurred.[n] By means of the Division we make clear what matters are agreed upon and what are contested, and announce what points we intend to take up. Proof is the presentation of our arguments, together with their corroboration.[o]

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[k] τέχνη (also παίδεία, ἐπιστήμη, μάθησις, *scientia, doctrina*), μίμησις, γυμνασία (also ἄσκησις, μελέτη, εμπειρία, συνηθεια, *declamatio*). The usual triad, Nature (φυσις, *nature, ingenium, facultas*), Theory, and Practice, can be traced back to Protagoras, Plato (*Phaedrus* 269 D), and Isocrates (*e.g., Antid.* 187; *Adv. Soph.* 14–18, where Imitation is also included). *Cf.* also Aristotle in Diogenes Laertius 5. 18; Cicero, *De Inv.* 1. i. 2. *De Oratore* 1. 4. 14; Dionysius Halic. in Syrianus, *Scholia Hermog.*, ed. Rabe, 1. 4–5; Tacitus, *Dialog. de Orator.*, ch. 33; Plutarch, *De liberis educ.* 4 (2 A); and see Paul Shorey, *Trans. Am. Pilol. Assn.* 40 (1909). 185–201. Imitation is presumed to have been emphasized in the Pergamene school of rhetors under Stoic influence. Quintilian, 3. 5. 1, tells us that it was classed by some writers as a fourth element, which he yet subordinates to Theory. On Imitation *cf.* Antonius in Cicero, *de Oratore* 2. 21. 89 ff.; Dionysius halic., *De Imitat.* (*Opuscula* 2. 197–217, ed. Usener-Rader-macher); Quintilian, 10. 1. 20 ff.; Eduard Stemplinger *Das Plagiat in der Griech. Lit.*, Leipzig and Berlin, 1912, pp. 81 ff.; Kroll, "Rhetorik", coll. 1113 ff.; Paulus Otto, *Quaestiones selectae ad libellum qui est* περι υψους spectantes, diss. Kiel, 1906, pp. 6–19; G. C. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace*, Madison, 1920, ch. 1; J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism*, Longon, New York, and Toronto, 1931, pp. 426 ff. Richard McKeon, "Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity," *Mod. Phiol.* 34, 1 (1936). 1–35, and esp. pp. 26 ff.; D. L. Clark, "Imitation : Theory and Practice in roman Rhetoric," *Quart. Journ. Speech* 37, 1 (1951). 11–22. "Exercise" refers to the *progymnasmata*, of which our treatise and Cicero's *De Inv.* show the first traces in Latin rhetoric, and to the "suasoriae" (*deliberations*) and "controversiae" (*causae*) in which the treatise abounds. See also 4. xliv. 59 (Refining). The divorce between *praeexercitamenta* and *exercitations* belongs to the Augustan period.

[l] The author's treatment of the parts of a discourse differs from that of Aristotle, who, in *Rhet.* 3. 13 (1414a) ff., discusses them—Proem, Statement of Facts, Proof, and Conclusion—with all three kinds of oratory in view, not only the judicial, under Arrangement. Note that Invention is applied concretely to the parts of the discourse; in 1. xi. 18 ff. below the Issues are subjoined to Proof and Refutation. *Cf.* Cicero, *De Inv.* 1. xiv. 19. The Stoic scheme included Proem, Statement of Facts, Replies to Opponents, and Conclusion (Diogenes Laertius 7. 43).

[m] παρασκευάζεται.The concept if Isocratean. *Cf. Rhet. Ad Alex.*, ch. 29 (1436a); Dionysius Halic., *De Lys.* 17; Anon. Seg. 5 and 9 (Spengel-Hammer 1 [2]. 353–4); Rufus 4 (Spengel-Hammer 1 [2]. 399); Anon., in Rabe, *Proleg. Sylloge*, p. 62.

[n] This definition is translated directly from a Greek original; see Hermogenes, *Progymn.* 2 (ed. rabe, p. 4), Syrianus, *Scholia Hermog.* (ed. Rabe, p. 4), Syrianus, *Scholia Hermog.* (ed. Rabe 2. 170), Theon 4 (Spengel 2. 78). *Cf.* Cicero, *De Inv.* 1. xix. 27.

[o] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Inv.* 1. xxiv. 34.

[p] *Cf.* Cicero, *De Inv.* 1. xlii. 78 (*reprehensio*).

Refutation is the destruction of our adversaries' arguments.[p] The Conclusion is the end of the discourse, formed in accordance with the principles of the art.

Along with the speaker's functions, in order to make the subject easier to understand, I have been led also to discuss the parts of a discourse, and to adapt these to the theory of Invention. It seems, then, that I must at this juncture first discuss the Introduction.[q]

DEVELOPING YOUR UNDERSTANDING

1. Referring to the pages you have from Book I of *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, summarize the function and scope of rhetoric. Compare and contrast what *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* puts forward with what Aristotle's *Rhetoric* puts forward.
2. Using the little bit of *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* you have available here and any other sources from this chapter, support, contend with, or modify how Foss, Foss, and Trapp (in the first reading from the chapter) represent Roman rhetoric.
3. Summarize the way *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* states rhetoric can be learned. Locate if and how other sources from this chapter identify how rhetoric can be learned, comparing and contrasting these sources with *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*. Finally, explain how what you discover about the education of the rhetor can be applied to your own education.

[q] προλόγος, probably.

Chapter 1
Projects

1. Chapter 6 of *Professional Writing and Rhetoric* argues that professional writing is defined, in great part, by its focus on readers or users; that is, professional writing and rhetoric is user- or reader-centered. Using the readings from Chapter 1, as well as other primary and secondary rhetorical sources you find through independent research, examine (meaning support, contend with, and/or modify) the following claim: Rhetoric is an audience-, reader-, or user-centered art.

2. Despite the fact that rhetoric is one of the oldest disciplines and was traditionally one of the core liberal arts, you will probably find yourself in many situations where you are asked to explain what rhetoric is. Your family will probably ask you, as they wonder what it is you are studying in this course. Interviewers will probably ask you, as they wonder what rhetoric adds to you as a potential employee. And if you happen to mention "rhetoric" to people at work, they will probably ask you what it is, also.

   Construct a scenario in which you might be asked to define rhetoric for someone. For this scenario, develop a text that defines the discipline. Since several scenarios that might call for a definition of rhetoric would not also typically call for a written document (i.e., they would call for a verbal response), you should approach this project creatively. Consider a variety of "texts" (maybe a movie-short, a children's book, a cartoon, or a taped dramatic dialogue) you could produce.

3. Obviously, four selected readings have not covered the entire discipline of rhetoric. There remain numerous issues/topics, rhetoricians, theoretical approaches, and histories that have not been represented, or represented well enough by the readings in this chapter.

   As a class, and with the help of your instructor, develop a list of issues/topics, rhetoricians, theoretical approaches, and/or histories that you could research further. Individually or in small groups, choose a research area, develop a research question into which you will inquire, and write a research plan to help guide your inquiry. Your aim should be to develop, as a class, a set of oral and written reports that you can bring back to the class in order to develop a more robust sense of rhetoric. The written reports should be published (in either print or online form) and incorporated into the class as additional readings/resources.